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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
BY DEPUTY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
Dr. Allen Panzer, ) CV13~070805MDDPMJCG 
Amy Sayers, ) 
Lily Jeung and ) Plaintiffs' Opposition to 
Darl"en Walchesky, on behalf of ) Motion to Dismiss First Cause 
tbemselves. and all others shnilarly) of Action and 
situated,' ) To Strike Class Action Allegations 
) and supporting documents 
i, .. 
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Plaintiffs, ) 
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30 
vs. 
Yelp, Inc. 
Defendant. 
) Date: February 10, 2013 
. ) Time: 10 a.lll. 
) Courtroom: 3 
) 
COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS in opposition to defendant Yelp, Inc.'s 
Motion to Dismiss and Strike. This is a fact and law based, commonplace FLSA 
action merely seeking fairness. This lawsuit is simply to get these plaintiffs their 
wages;just as Yelp has paid wage::~ to all others for their labors and reviews. 
31 Daniel A. Bernath 
32 Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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MEl\10RANDUlVI OF' LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Yelp, Inc. wraps itself in Old Glory and the First Amendment 
but it is really something much more sinister. This is a simple case of an 
ernployer/ capitalist, again not paying the wages of some of its employees. 
The plaintiffs herein are all writers for Yelp, Inc. Yelp has paid all of its 
writers one way or the other. Some of its writers it has paid properly in 
wages for over 200,000 reviews. Other Yelp employees are paid in trinkets, 
social advancenlent and a Jedi lwind Trick to get young people to work for 
the rnere glory of participation in this new fangled ill.edium-the internet. It 
is settled law that elnployers must pay their employees in wages and not 
"all the ice cream you can eat" or other techniques contrary to the FLSA. 
Employer can't get the empioyees to waive their wages, can't pay them in 
glory of working for the movie/fashion/journalism business and can't pay 
theln in shiny objects asthe settlers bought NIanhattan Island with $24 of 
trinkets and beads. Yelp, Inc. actually has to follow the FLSA when it 
comes to paying its workers; just like any other business in the country. 
Yelp Inakes hundreds of millions of dollars off of its writers each year. They 
have paid hundreds of thousands to some of Yelp's writers but have found 
that for a certain class of status seeking people that they will enrich Yelp for ~ 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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51 mere pats on the back and trinkets. Indeed, Yelp has a history of using 
52 these tricks to avoid its civil responsibility to pay wages and taxes. It was 
53 sued and has just recently settled a lawsuit where other workers at Yelp 
54 were not getting paid overtime. Yelp, Inc.'s defense again was they were 
55 "volunteers" who in the end would get paid lTIOre in commissions by 
56 working unpaid overtime. Yelp, Inc., eventually agreed to pay the overtime 
57 owed, rather than face much higher penalties laid out by a jury. 
58 Yelp, likes to portray itself as a public service. But in fact at 
least two judges have said it is the modern day "Mafia." 
Judges have seen through Yelp!s unethical behavior and have 
awarded damages and admonished Yelp! for misusing the 
62 common law and violating citizens' rights. On April 26, 2013, after hearing 
63 sworn testim.ony from a Yelp! s executive, Trial Judge Peter S. Doft in San 
64 Diego California ruled that Yelp! uses brazen and audacious extortion 
65 techniques against helpless small businesses. The Court also declared that 
66 Yelp! tvvists the law to make it say the exact opposite of settled legal 
67 principles and that Yelp! should pay punitive damages. The San Diego 
68 Judge stated: "Yelp! is "is the modern-dayversiol1 of the mafia To 
69 to me, I believe it might be a case for punitive damages, .... I'm just stunned 
70 actually I mean, every single bit of settled law is twisted around by [Yelp! ]. 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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71 Everything is twisted around." Oregon Circuit Court Judge Henry Kantor 
72 has stated that Yelp is under investigation by the attorney general and that 
73 Yelp, Inc., appears to act like "organized crime. " 
74 Yelp has been accused nearly 500 times in filings before the Federal Trade 
75 Comrnission of criminal extortion. 
People will file "reviews" of businesses 
•• 
on Yelp. Yelp will then take all the 
positive reviews and hide them from 
easy access of an IPhone as people look 
for a restaurant or other business. Yelp, 
81 Inc., "viII then take the scathing reviews (some written by Yelp, Inc. 
82 elnployees-some several years old) and place them on the restaurants 
83 review page, along "With a one or tvvo star. Businesses have closed because of 
84 this Yelp, Inc., business practice. lVlerchant'slives have been threatened 
85 after false reviews placed on Yelp.com. One business had its windows shot 
86 out by gunfire and a brick three tinles and eventually closed because a fired 
87 employee accused the beautician owner of wearing women's underwear 
88 under his clothes and making a racial remark. Yelp's standard answer to 
89 such pleas by the merchant is "we can fix that-send us money for 
90 advertising." A search of google.com with the words "Yelp Extortion" M 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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1Il, 
91 reveals: About 76,800 results (0.25 seconds) and "Yelp blackmail" About 0", 
92 80,400 results (0.21 seconds). This bad conduct by Yelp is NOT the 
93 subject of this lawsuit but is placed here to reply to Yelp's atte111pt to appear 
94 as a Mother Teresa of the digital age. 
95 The non wage paid writers of Yelp, Inc., that Yelp wants to cheat out of 
their wages are the subject of this lawsuit. 
97 The con1.plaint is NOT a Class Action governed by 12b 
98 But is a Collective Action under the completely separate 
99 I A:n,d liberal requirell.nents of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
100 Yelp, Inc. is cynically urging that this Court apply irrelevant statutes. The 
101 requirements for § 216(b) collective actions are independent of, and 
102 unrelated to the requirenlents for Rule 23 class certification. Wang v. 
103 Chinese Daily News~ Inc. 623 F.3d '743, 761 (9th Cir. 2010) "the clear 
104 weight of authority holds that Rule 23 procedures are inappropriate for the 
105 prosecution ... under § 216(b)") "The requisite showing of similarly of claims 
106 under the FLSA is considerably less stringent than the requisite 
107 showing under Rule 23." (emph.added) Lewis v. Wells Pargo Co. 669 
108 F.SUPP.2nd 1124, 1127 (N.D.Cal. 2009) Courts have noted that Congress 
109 clearly chose not to have Rule 23 standards apply. (While Congress could 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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110 have imported the more stringent criteria for class certification under FRep 
111 23, it has not done so in the FLSA) Thiessen v. GE Cap., 267 Fd 3d at 1105. 
112 Looking to the standard for FLSA actions for pay for work done, a reading 
113 of the complaint shows that the pleading standards have been n1et: 
114 STREAMLINING WAGEA...l\fD HOUR MOTION PRACTICE 
115 By George A. Hanson_American Bar Association' 
116 http://tinyurtcom~67Vq 
117 Wage and hour motion practice differs from run-of-the-mill federal 
118 cases. The Opt-In Process; A Lenient Standard 
119 True class actions require a "rigorous analysis" of the Rule 23(a) 
120 prerequisiteS.l Plaintiffs "must be prepared to prove that there are in 
121 fact sufficiently numerous parties, comrnon questions of law or fact, 
122 etC./'2 as wen as show predorninance and superiority under Rule 
123 23(b)(3). Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases are not true class 
124 actiol1s,3 The court may send this notice after plaintiffs make a 
125 1nodestfactual showing that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs 
126 together were victirns of a common policy or plan that violated the 
127 law. Notice the phrase "modest/actual showing." (in original) 
128 This "question is quite distinct from the question whether plaintiffs 
129 have satisfied the much higher threshold of demonstrating that 
,. 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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130 commoquestions of law and fact will predominate' for Rule 23 
131 purposes." While FLSA plaintiffs must offer more than '''unsupported 
132 assertions,'" they face "a low standard of proof' at step one. A 
133 lTlOtion brought under the FLSA "usually results in conditional 
134 certification." 
135 
136 Though elnployees 1nust show plausible entitlernent to relief, 
137 vVithin the con.text of wage and hour litigation, these motions (to 
138 dismiss) frequently lack ill.erit and delay the proceedings while 
139 unnecessarily consuming judicial resources. This should rarely be an 
140 issue in FLSA cases. Employees generally do not have to rely on 
141 inferences about ll.IDseen conduct. They need not offer 
142 precise time records, and theirpieading allegations are 
143 "accepted as tru~." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
144 The UDshot is sllllple: when an employee pleads that sh.e 
145 worked 45 hours, but only got paid for 40, she has complied 
146 with Rule 8's plausibility standard~. ("Unlike the complex 
147 antitrust scheme at issue in Twombly that ... the requirements to state 
148 a c1airn of a FLSA violation are quite straightforward.") Even when 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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149 pleadings are less specific:. liberal anlendment rules mean that early 
150 n10tions to dismiss 'will rarely advance the litigation. 
151 
152 PLAINTmffS CANNO'li WAMVE Tt1iE~RRIGH'rS UNDER. THE FSLA 
153 AND ANY SO CALLED AGREEMENT 
154 TO THE CON1'RARY IS UNENFORCEABLE 
155 Plaintiffs boldly state, that plaintiffs were never hired or fired by Yelp 
156 Under the FLSA analysis, m.aster-servant anaiysis, California Labor Law 
157 and Oregon Labor Law analysis and workers cOlnpensation analysis the 
158 paid-in-trinkets plaintiffs were employees and entitled to be also paid in 
159 wages. (See also Gatt v. Fox Searchli.ght~ infra) i\.ll of the factors that 
160 defendant urges on the Court are not factors required in theses statutes and 
161 case law. Defendants just made them up. Defendant also gives this court 
162 documents that are not relevant to this demurrer. The so called "Terms of 
163 Service" is not the TOS that existed when plaintiffs began working for 
164 defendant and the "Elite TernlS of Service'~ was drafted by defendant just so 
165 this judge will read it for this Illotion and was created 4 years after plaintiffs 
166 began working for defendant. 
167 A tenant cannot waive their right to a clean and healthy because the . 
168 landlord tacked a "Terms of Service" onto the inside of tenant's closet door 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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169 stating that she agrees to waive the Warranty of Habitability. A lawyer can't 
170 have a client waive his right to sue the lawyer for malpractice by having the 
171 lawyer slip in a TOS into his monthly bill. So too here; the writers who has 
172 made Yelp, Inc. $220,000,000 a year cannot waive their rights to wages 
173 under the FLSA. 
174 "[Tlhe purposes of the ActJ'eguire that it be applied eve~ to 
175 those 'Ivho would d(~cline its protectionso If an exception to the Act 
176 w'ere carved out for elnployees willing to testify that they performed work 
177 'voluntarily,' employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to 
178 coerce employees to make such assertions) or to waive their protections 
179 under the Act." Tony & Susan .AlwTLO Found. v. See'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 
180 299, 301 (1985). 
181 Mischief such as Yelp presenting unconscionable waivers in docunlents 
182 long after the relationship began should cause the Court to suspect that 
183 nothing defendants do can be trusted. Even if the documents were 
184 relevant, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act explicitly prohibits 
18S "inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract.~' Cal. Civ. Code § 
186 1770(a)(19). CAL. eN. CODE § 1670.5: California Code - Section 1670.s(a) 
187 (a)If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
188 the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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189 court Inay refuse to enforce the contract, or it m.ay enforce the remainder of 
190 the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so Ihnit the 
191 application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
192 result. 
193 PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PLED THAT 
194 THEY WERE NON-WAGE PAID WRITERS OF YELP 
195 AND TeiftS ACTION IS SO THEY MERELY BIE TREATED 
196 Lnc:re THE WRITERS Of THE OVeR 200,,000 PAID REVIEWS 
197 WRITTEN BY THE YELP WAGE-PAID WRITERS 
199 The complaint clearly states that Plaintiffs were employees of Yelp, as were 
200 aU other enlployees. Yelp paid SOIne in wages but paid plaintiffs in trinkets. 
201 FLSA requires that all writers be paid in wages and not just the Yelp 
202 Comlnunity Managers and the 200,000 other Yelp employees. The labors 
203 of Plaintiffs have gained Yelp the $244,-000,000 annually that it garners. 
204 It is exactly the SaIne w·ork that is done by the wage paid 200,000 revie·ws. 
205 This has all be pled in the complaint and that is all that the FLSA requires: 
206 To state a valid FLSA claim, plaintiffs had to allege (1) that they were 
207 elnployed by Caritas; (2) that their work involved interstate activity; and (3) 
PLAI~TIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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208 that they performed work for which they were under-compensated. 29 
209 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1) 
210 Pruell v. Caritas Christi 678 F.3d 10 (2012); (finding the first element 
211 satisfied by rnere allegation that the plaintiff "was an employee" and "was 
212 employed" by the defendant) 
213 
214 Haskins v. VIP Wireless Consulting 2009 WL 4639070, at *7 CW.D. Pa. 
215 Dec. T, 2009) VIP contended that Haskins was ineligible from FLSA 
216 provisions. However, whether a plaintiff is ineligible for FLSA protection is 
217 mixed question of law and fact to be resolved by the court. This analysis 
218 requires the court to review the historical or record facts and apply all 
219 inferences drawn from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Such a detailed, 
220 fact-intensive analysis is impossible at the demurrer stage. 
221 http.!lJtinyurl.comLp9gxst9. page 12 
222 A DIEMURRER/MOTMON TO STRIKE 
223 IS NOT A PROPER 51" AGE Of "rHIE LITIGATION 
•• 
224 To DETERMINE COMPLEX AND HIGHLY CONTROVERTED FACTUAL 
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226 "This analysis requires the court to review the historical or record facts and 
227 apply all inferences drawn froni these facts in favor of th~ plaintiff. In 
228 doing so, the court must narrowly construe the FLSA provisions against the 
229 enlployer seeking to assert the exemptions." see Hein v. PNC Fin. Servs. 
230 Group, Inc. 511 F.Sup.2d 563, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2007) and Morisky v. Pub. Srv 
231 Elect. 111 F.SUpp,2d 493,499 (D. N.J-. 2000) Determine the exerrlpt or non 
232 exempt status of any particular employee "is an extremely and individual 
233 and fact-intensive" and requires "careful factual analysis of the full range of 
234 the employee's job duties and responsibilities. ") see also Hein v. PNC Fin. 
235 8ervs. Gr:p" Inc. , 511 F. Supp, 2d 563,570 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("We conclude 
236 that such a detailed, fact-intensive analysis is impossible at this stage of the 
237 litigation."); Snyder v. Dietz & VtTatson, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 428,451,452 
238 52, CD.N.J. 2(11) 
239 California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) 
2403706. Special Employment - General Employer and/or Specia.l Employer 
241 Denies Responsibility 
242 
243 "In determining whether a special employment relationship exists, the 
244 primary consideration is whether the special employer has I "[t]he right to 
245 control and direct the activities of the alleged employee or the manner 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS .AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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246 and method in which the work is periormed, whether exercised or not. .. 
247 .Ii However, '[whether] the right to control existed or was exercised is 
248 generally a question of fact to be resolved from the reasonable inferences 
249 to be drawn from the circumstances shown: II (Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co. 
250 (1979) 23 Cai.3d 168, 175 [151 CaLRptr. 671, 588 P.2d 811], citations 
251 omitted.) 
252 Contract terms are not conclusive evidence of the existence of the right to 
253 control. (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 176.) 
254 The existence of a special employment relationship may be supported by 
255 evidence that (i) the alleged special employer paid wages to tile 
256 employee, (2) the alleged special employer had the power to discharge the 
257 employee, (3) the work performed by the employee was unskilled, (4) the 
258 work tools were provided by the alleged special employer, (5) the work was 
259 part of the alleged special employe(s regular business, (6) the employee 
260 expressly or impliedly consented to a special employment relationship, (7) 
261 the parties believed they were creating a special employment relationship, 
262 and (8) the alleged special employment period was lengthy. (Kowalski, 
263 supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 176-177.) 
264 An employer that fails to adhere to the Act's record keeping requirements 
265 cannot later cOlllplain that its employees' evidence of damages is inexact or 
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266 imprecise. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
failed to keep accurate records and to credit all hours worked in violation of 
268 the Employee Retirenlent Inco:me Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1059(a)(1), l104(a)(1) n this circunlstance, if (1) the evidence shows that the 
270 employee performed work for which there was improper compensation, 
271 and (2) the amount and the extent of work can reasonably be inferred, then 
the wages owed to an employee should be awarded even if approximate. Id. 
273 at 687-88. 
274 The burden of proof shifts to the employer to produce evidence of the 
275 precise a:mount of work the ernployee perfonned or evidence that negates 
the just and reasonable inferences drawn frOlll the employee's evidence. Id 
277 Elwell v. University Hospitals Hon1e Care Serv.) 276 F.3d 832 ,844 (6th 
Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held that a district court should properly have 
279 instructed a jury that evidence of recol'dkeeping violations can be an 
280 element of recklessness or willfulness. A finding of willfulness would have 
operated to extend the normal two-year statute of limitations to three years. 
Id. at 842. 
e 
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286 Under an legal analysis 
- 287 Yelp, Inc. also owes plaintiffs wages -
288 .And not just trinkets, chocolate and a cult like membership 
~ 
289 Again, plaintiffs have sufficient pled that they are elnployees of defendant 
290 Yelp. that is all that is required by the FLSA and its very loose pleading 
291 standard to defeat a demurrer. Zhong v, August Corp. 498 F. Supp. 2d 
292 625, 628 (S.D,N.Y. 2007) 
. 293 Even if more was required (it is not) plaintiffs are entitled to relief under 
294 the FLSA and all other analyses. Under com.mon law, federal law, workers 
295 compensation, wage and law and revenue la~vv, Yelp! is the employer of 
296 plaintiff writers and has been reaping billions of dollars by (a) not paying 
297 for their services as writers and (b) attelnpting to evade compensating 
298 victiIns when Yelp! commits torts against helpless merchants. Yelp is a bad 
299 corporate citizen. Taking from the systelTI and never paying back its fair 
300 share. Yelp appears to have been cheating the taxing authorities across the 
301 country by misc1assifying its labor force. 
302 ~~V analysis~Plaintiff\Vriters are employees of Yelp! 
303 Restatement of Agency ~ 
, 
~ 
Q) 
b.O 
C\l 
0.. 
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304 § 1.02 Parties' Labeling And Popular Usage Not Controlling 
305 Link to Case Citations 
306 An agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in § 1.01 are 
307 present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement 
308 between parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is not 
309 controlling. 
310 REST :Jd ~GE~TCY § 1.02§ 1 •. 03 Manifestation 
311 A person manifests assent or intention through written or spoken words or 
312 other conduct. 
313 
314 fede~al Law Analysis, Plaintiff Writers are employees of Yelp! 
315 Yelp! admits that they are not paying "Yelpers" in wages or stock but in 
316 merchandise, badges) accolades, "booze" food, swag andparties. The US 
317 District Court Judge in the Southern District of New York declares: 
318 " Rather than monetary compensation, the unpaid content providers 
319 are offered exposure - nalnely, visibility, promotion, and 
320 distribution, for thenlselves and their work~ .... 
321 The unpaid submissions are arguably the website's most valuable 
322 content, both because of their effect of "optimizing" the website's· 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG   Document 39   Filed 01/23/14   Page 21 of 86   Page ID #:326
.~ 
.... ,l'., 
323 ranking in search engines such as Google (thus attracting more 
324 viewers to the website) and because they allow (website) to keep 
325 production costs low. 
326 From its inception, The {website} has generated revenue by, among 
327 other things, selling advertising targeted towards visitors to the 
328 website. Advertising revenues increase in proportion to the amount of 
329 page views a website receives, which in turn is a function of the 
330 quality of the content provided, as well as the website's ability to 
331 attract visitors either through its o\,\'1.11narketing or via the social 
332 networks of others. 
333 Summary Judgment Order P.5 Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 11 eiv. 2472, 
334 NYLJ 1202547682116, at *1 (SDNY, Decided) 
335 Inter alia the Court stated that so called "unpaid" employees are paid in 
336 non traditional methods "rather than lllonetary compensation". P. 5 
337 
338 The US District Court for the Southern District of New York in a carefully 
339 reasoned case held that non wa~~aid workers for the movie companies 
340 are clnployees of the movie compan)§ Eric Glatt, et ai., v. Fox 
341 SearchUght Pictures, et aI., 11 Civ 6784 (attached) 
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342 Glatt and FootInan were unpaid interns who worked for the production 
343 The Black Swan and 500 Days of Summer or in the office. The non wage 
344 enlployees were paid in razzle dazzle from Tinsel Town, attendance at the 
345 Wrap Party with the stars, prestige, exposure and resume enhancement-but 
346 not in wages. The Court held that defendants were the elnployers of the 
347 non wage paid laborers. 
348 Was Searchlight the Employer of Glatt and Footman? 9 
349 Plaintiffs and Defendants each move for summary judgment on the 
350 issue of whether Searchlight was the "employerll of Glatt and 
351 Footman as that term is defined in the US Fair Labor Standards Act 
352 (FLSA). .. The FLSA defines Hemplrut as lito suffer or permit to 
353 work"l 29 U.S.C. § of joint employers, and nail joint employers are 
354 responsible, both individually and jointly, with all the applicable 
355 provisions of the [FLSA]." 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). 
356 II[T]he lstriking breadth l of the FLSA1s definition of 'employl 'stretches 
the meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not 't 357 
358 qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law 
359 Qrinciple~.iI' Barfield v. N.V.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.,537 F.3d 132, 
360 141 (2d Gir. 200B) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 f:'.. 
~ 
U.S. 318, 326 (1992)). iI[W]hether an employer-employee Q) 361 b.O n:l 
0... 
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;1 
362 relationship exists for purposes 9f the FLSA should be grounded 
363 in 'economic reality rather than technical concepts. 1I1 Birfield, 537 
364 F.3d at141 (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 
365 U.S. 28, 33 (1961 )). "Employment" under the FLSA is lito be 
366 determined on a case-by-ca.se basis by review of the totality of the 
367 circumstances. I! Barl:ield, 537' F.3d at 141-42. "Above and beyond the 
368 plain language, moreover, the remedial nature of the statute further 
369 warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions so that they 
370 will have fithe "",dept po~sible imp-act in the national economy. III 
371 Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 1'72 F.3c1132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) 
372 (quoting Carter V. Dutchess Cmty.Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 
373 1984)). orWhen it comes to 'employer' status under the FLSA, control 
374 is key. I! Lopez v.Acme Am. EnvtL CO' l No. 12 Civ. 5'11(WHP), 2012 
375 WL 6062501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,2012). 
376 . A. Formal Control Test 
377 1. Hiring and Firing Power 
378 This factor focuses on the lithe power to hire and fire,1i not whetrler 
379 that power was exercised. See Carter, 735 F.2d at 12 ... " 
380 Searchlight's ability to hire managerial staff is enough to satisfy this 
CO 
factor. See Herman, 1-'2 F.3d at 140 M 381 Q.) bJ) 
ro 
0.. 
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383 Searchlight's power to fire Black Swan production staff was unbridled. 
384 Searchlight reserved the right, "in its sole reasonable discretion, II to 
385 II •••• dispense with the services of any person rendering services with 
386 respect to [Black Swan]. 
387 Functional Control Test 
388 A district court must "jook beyond an entitls formal right to control 
the physical performance of anotherEs work before declaring that the 
390 entity is not an employer under the FLSA." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69. 
391 'I[AJn entity can be a jOint employer under the FLSA even when it 
392 does not hire and fire its joint employees, directly dictate their hours, 
393 or paythem." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 70. (p. 14) 
394 1\10 single factor is controlling; the test "requires consideration of all 
395 the circumstances. Ii Archie v. Grand Cent. P'ship, 997 F. Supp. 504, 
396 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Wang, 2013 WL 1903787, at *4 ("[T]he 
397 prevailing view is the totality of the circumstances test. 1I).p.25 
398 6. Whether Searchlight and the Plaintiffs Understood They Were 
399 Entitled to Wages 
400 Glatt and Footman understood they would not be paid. But this factor 
401 adds little, because the FLSA does not allow employees to waive 
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402 their entitlement to wages. ~T]he purposes of the Act require that it 
403 be apgiied even to those who would decline its protections. If an 
404 exception to the Act were carved out for employees wi11ing to testify 
405 tilat they performed work Voluntarily, I employers might be able to use 
406 superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make such 
407 assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act. 1I Tony & Susan 
408 Alamo Found. v. See'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 299, 301 (1985). This 
409 protects more than the Plaintiffs themselves, because II[S ]uch 
410 exceptions to coverage would ... exert a general downward pressure 
411 on wages in competing businesses. II Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 
412 471 U.S.at302. It also protects businesses by preventing 
413 anticompetitlve behavior. !IAn employer is not to be allowed to gain a 
414 competitive advantage by reason of the fact that his employees are 
415 more willing to waive [FLSA claims] than are those of his competitor.1I 
416 Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945). 
417 Considering the totality of the circumstances, Glatt and Footman 
418 were classified improperly as unpaid [non wage paid] interns and 
419 are lIemployeesll covered by the FLSA and NYLL. They worked as 
420 paid employees work, providing an immediate advantage to their 
421 employer ... 
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442 her medical attention in a life threatening crisis; 54,57-reviewer told to 
443 ""rite two star reviews apparently so the victim restaurant would then be 
444 willing to give Yelp money to have them removed, Yelp Community 
445 Managers nationvvide, tasked to keep writers under control so they would 
446 follow the rules. (As Yelp controlled the Community Managers and paid 
447 them wages t therefore they controlled the plaintiffs herein. (Searchlighfs 
448 ability to hire managerial staff is enough to satisfy this factor. See 
449 Hermanj 172 F.3d at 140) 
450 
451 Other false issues advanced by Yelp, IncG to distract the Court 
452 Yelp gives a closing argunlent in its Motion to Strike. It gives no 
453 authority for the law it pushes on this Court. 
454 "Yelp has no power to hire and :fil"e~" says Yelp. Again, this is a closing 
455 argument and contradicts the pled admissions by defendants in complaint. 
456 "Yelp lacks supervision and control of plaintiffs" again, the facts 
457 are pled in great d.etail in the Complaint and Yelp is simply making a 
458 closing argument. 
459 "Yelp's alleged control over employees" The facts have been pled in 
460 great detail. 
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462 "Yelp urges, encourages and educates users" 
463 Here, Yelp bluntly lies to the Court. It states that Yelp did not supervise the 
464 creation of content, posting of content, mandated creation of content, or 
465 force plaintiffs to sublnit any content at all. This is all a bald face 
466 Inisrepresentation by Yelp. Defendants contacted plaintiffs and demanded 
467 that they write more and right more, right now. Complaint 16, 17, 18 
468 Plaintiffs were "often directed to write more reviews if in 
469 Defendant~s opinion her production seenled to slack off," And, as 
470 previously discussed, Yelp told plaintiffs what to write, how to write it and 
471 then fired them if they disobeyed the rules or continually threatened them 
472 with such termination. 
473 Yelp~s motivational a:wvards~ The awards were merely one other way 
474 that Yelp paid these plaintiff employees-just like Fox Searchlight paid its 
475 unpaid laborers in prestige. Swag, parties and a flashy space on their 
476 resume. Plaintiffs nlerely demand t.hat the FLSA be enforced and 
477 defendants now pay thenl wages too. 
478 Yelp's control through its Elite Squad Again, Yelp presents an "Elites 
479 agreement" that they drafted for this litigation, for this judge and for this 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
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480 rnotion. Nobody has seen this "agreement" until Yelp was put on Notice 
481 that the non wage paid employees were enforcing their rights under FLSA. 
482 Yelp's "rate and methods9~-paying plaintiffs not in wage§ 4 years 
483 after the employment relationship began. The "rate and method 
484 test" that Yelp pushes on the Court do not exist. 
485 Yelp's admission that Yelp did not ll'laintam records~ Actually, 
486 each review written by each plaintiff has been recorded, each picture that 
487 plaintiffs provided and which Yelp published has been recorded, each even 
488 that plaintiffs conducted for Yelp has been recorded. In any case, the fact 
489 that Yelp did. not keep employment records cuts against Yelp as an ethical 
490 and law abiding business citizen. Employees generally do not have to 
491 rely on inferences about unseen conduct. They need not offer 
492 precise time recol"ds~ and theiI:.,n.leading allegations are 
493 "accepted as true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Anenlployer 
494 that fails to adhere to the Act's record keeping requirements cannot later 
495 complain that its employees' evidence of damages is inexact or imprecise. 
496 Anderson v. l'vIt. Clelnens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). failed to keep 
497 accurate records and to credit all hours worked in violation of the Employee 
498 Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ l059(a)(1), 
499 llo4(a)(1) n this circumstance, if (1) the e'\iidence shows that the employee 
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500 performed work for which there was improper compensation, and (2) 
501 the amount and the extent of work can reasonably be inferred, then the 
502 wages owed to an employee should be awarded even if approximate. Id. at 
503 687-88. The burden of proof shifts to the employer to produce evidence of 
504 the precise amount of work the employee performed or evidence that 
505 negates the just and reasonable nferences drawn from the employee's 
506 evidenc.e. Id In Elwell v. University Hospitals Home Care Serv., 276 F.3d 
507 832, 844 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held that a district court should 
508 properly have instructed a jury that evidence of recordkeeping violations 
509 can be an elen1ent of recklessness or willfulness. A finding of willfulness 
510 would have operated to extend the normal two-year 
511 statute of Ihnitations to three years. Id. at 842. 
512 
513 January 10, 2014 
514 
515 
516 Daniel A. Bernath, attorney for plaintiffs 
517 
518 
519 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
- ~ - ~ - - - - -. - - - - - ~ - .... - ~ - - ~ • - - - - - -X. 
ERIC GLATTl et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-against-
FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES 
INC., et ana.,. 
Defendants 
-" - ---- .- --- --- .. - --- -- ----- - ,.. -- -x. 
11 Civ. 6784 (Vv1-IP) 
MEMORANDUM &. 9RDER 
Plaintiffs Eric Glatt, Alexander Footman, Kanene Gratts, and Eden AntaIik bring 
this putative class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New York Labor Law 
("NYLL"); and California Unfair Competition Law ("CADCL") against Defendants Fox 
Searchlight Pictures Inc. ("Searchlight") and Fox Enteltarr.ment Group, Inc. ("FEG"). Plaintiffs 
contend that Searchlight a:..'1d FEG violated federal and state labor laws by classifying them as 
unpaid interns instead of paid employees. 
Glatt, Footman! and Gratts move for summary judgment that (1) they were . 
"employees~' covered by the FLSAand NYLL and (2) Search.light was their employer. Antalik 
moves for class certification of her NYLL claims and conditi.onal certiftcation of a collective 
action for her FLSA claims. Defendants move for summary judgment that (1) Gratts's claims 
are time-barred; (2) Searchlight did not employ Glatt, Footman, or Gratts; (3) FEG did not 
employ Antalik; and. (4) SearchIir,ht did not employ any of the production intems 011 five films 
financed. by Searchlight For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is 
granted in part and denied in part't Defendants' summary judgment motion is granted in part and 
denied in part, and Antalik's motions for class certification of her NYLL claims and conditional 
certification of an FLSA collective action ate granted. t:;; '-"Iff "' . 
FO)( .se 14# litl,tr/-
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BACKGROUND 
. 
The Parties 
Glatt md. Footman were unpaid interns who worked on production of the film 
l1lack S~~ in New 'York. After production ended, Glatt took a second unpaid internship 
relating to Blacl~"S\van's post-production. Grans was at.'1 unpaid intern who worked on 
production oftbe film SQO Day,§ of Summer in California. Autalik was an unpaid intern at 
Searchlight's corporate offices ill New York. 
FEG is the parent corporation of approximately 800 subsidiaries, including co-
defendant Searchlight. Searchlight produces and distributes feature films. Searchlight does not 
piOduce the films itself. Rather, it enters into Production-Distribution-Finance A!,rrecments 
(UProduction Ab,rreementsH ) with corporations created for the sole purpose of producing 
particular films. 
Black Swan began as a coHaboration bcnveen director Darren Aronofsky and 
producer Scott Franklin. Aronofsky and Franklin incorporated Lake of Tears. In.c. for the 
purpose ofptodtlcing Bla~k Swan. On November 2, 2009, Searchlight and Lake of Tears 
entered into a Production Agreement for Bh.'lck S~!!. 
500 Days of S,ummer was produced. by 500 DS Films) Inc.; a corporation created 
solely to produce that film. Searchlight entered into a Production Agreement with 500 DS Films 
for 500 Days (If SWll.t'ller. The Production Agreements for Black Swan and 500 Days of SlJ;..m.msrr 
2 
fII 
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do not differ materially from one another. t They gave Searchlight the power to hire and fire 
production persollnel. set budgets, and monitor the progress of films. 
FEG~s Internship Progran1 
A11ta1';k claims she \;vas part of a "centralized unpaid internship prograrn!'! in which 
unpaid interns at PEG's subsidiaries were subject to a sin.gle set of r"oHcies administered by a 
small team ofintern recruiters. She maintains that two employees oversaw FEG's internship 
program during the relevant periods and their responsibilities included soliciting "intern request 
fomlS" from supervisors at subsidiaries intere.<)ted in hiring intems, approving those requests, 
screening internship applicants, and processing interns' paperwork. According to Antalik. she 
and the members of her proposed class and collective action were victims of a common policy of 
using unpaid interns to perfoml work that required them to be paid. 
Defenda.nts deny there was any "centralized" internship program. They argue 
iIlternships varied considerably among vadous FEG subsidi.aries and departments, and ~nte'rns' 
experiences were shaped by the particular supervisors tiley were matched with. 
DISCUSSION: 
SU111lTI.ary judgment ehould be granted jf the record shows that "there is no 
genuine dispute as to arty material fact and. the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.H Fed. R. Civ. p, 56(a); .§..ee alsQ Anderson v. Libertv Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242.247 (1986). 
The burden of demonstrati.ng the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests with 
the moving party. Se~: .Adickcs Y. S,11. Kre§s & Co., 398 U.s. 144, 157 (1970). Ouce the moving 
I May 10,2013 Tr. at 52;23-53:4. 
3 
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F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Equitable toIling is 
appropriate when the plaintiff (1) filed a defective pleading that othenvise would have been 
timely, (2) was unaware of her cause of action due to the misleading conduct of the defendant, or 
(3) has a medical or mental condition preventing her from proceeding in a timely fashion. 
ZeriUi~Edelglass, 333 FJd at 80. If one of those conditions applies, the plaintiff must show she 
"(1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) 
has proved that the circumstances are so extraorrul1aty frHlt the doctrine should apply.H Zerilli .. 
Edelgl~, 333 F.3d at 80~81 (intemal quotation omitted). 
Gratts has 8. weaker claim to equitable tolling than her co-plaintiffs because she is 
the only plaintiff who was aware of her pOtential wage claim nearly from the day it accrued. 
Gratts testified that she understood she would earn minimum wage at her internship.23 After her 
intemship, she left seve!".!l messages at the p.roduction office and even wont to the Fox Studios 
lot to try to get her paycheck.24 Unlike an unpaid intom wh.o does not realize she may be entitled 
to compensation, Gratts wa.."i aware of her claim since 2008 and did not act with reasonable 
diligenc;J;) in the, time period she s{:eks to have tolled. 
Gratts's CAUCL daim is time-barred because her internship ended before August 
2008 and she is not entitled to equitable tolling. 
III. Was Sear@1ight the Employer of Glatt and Footman? 
Plaintiffs and Defendants each move for summary judgment on the issue of 
whether Searchlight was the "employer" of Glatt and Footman as that term is defined in the 
FLSA and NYLL The FLSA defines "employ" as "to suffer or penni! to work." 29 U.S. C. § 
---.--...•.. --
23 GratIs Tr. at 66:12-19; 69:12~70:8; 149:19.25. 
:4 Gratts Tr. 74:6-19; 185:6-i86;5. 
8 
~. 
'. 
Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG   Document 39   Filed 01/23/14   Page 34 of 86   Page ID #:339
, ' 
203(g), The law allows for the possibility ofjoint employers, and "aU joint employers are 
responsible, both individually and jointly, with all the applicable provisions of the [FLSA]." 29 
C,F.R § 791.2(a). 
"[TJhc 'striking breadth' of the FLSA's definition of 'employ' 'stretches the 
meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict 
application oftraditioml1 agency Jaw principles.'" iiflJfieldv. N':'~~C. Health & Hasps. Com·, 
537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotingN!!.tioTiwideMt!t. Ii'!$.. CO •. Yt Darden. 503 U.S. 318, 
326 (1992)), '~[W]hether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA 
should be grounded in 'economic reality rather than technical concepts. m ~~rfield, 537 F.3d at 
141 (quoting Goldberg_v. Wh.i.lakftIHqllse.Copp.~ Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)). "'Employment" 
under the FLSA is "to be detem1ined on a case'·hy~case b.qsis by review of the totality of the 
circumstances.'~ Barodd. 537 F.3d at 141~42. "Above and beyond the plain language, 
moreover, the remedial nature of the statute further wruTants an expansive interpretation of its 
provisions so that they will have 'the widest possible impact in the national economy. m HCnrLat! 
y;,. RSR Sec. SstIVS. L1;d~'i 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Carterv. Dutchess Cmty. 
CoIL, 735 F.2d 8. 12 (2d Cir. 1984). 
"¥lhen .1t comes to 'employer' status under the FLSA. control is key." Lopez v. 
ACD1~Am. Envtl. Co.~ No. 12 Civ. 51I(V;rHP}, 2012 WL 6062501 1 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 
2012). The Second Cir<:uit has set out different tests to aid in determining whether an 
employment relationship exists under the FLSA. Cart~ adopted a four~factor test to detemline 
whether an alleged joint employer exercised "fonnal control" over an empl.oyee: "whether the 
alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled 
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) detennined the rate and method of ' 
9 
It 
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payment, and (4) maintained employment records." 735 F.2d at 12 (quotingBonnette v, Cal. 
J-lealth & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983»). 
~hen,g. v. LihertL~J!rel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003) articulated another set 
offactors for determining whether an alleged employer exercised <'functional control" over an 
emp loyee even ifit lacked formal control: "(1) whether the ( alleged employer's] premises and 
equipment were used for the plaintiffs' work~ (2) whether the [suhcontractors] had. a business 
that could or did shift as a unit from Ottt} putative j oint employer to another; (3) the extent to 
which plaintiff.') perfbmled a discrete iine~job that was integral to [the alleged employer)s] 
process of production; (4) whether responsihility under the contracts could pass fi'om one 
subcontractor to anOlhcr without material changes; (5) the degree to which the [alleged 
employer] or [its] agents supervised plaintiffs' work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked 
exclusively or predominantly for the (aUeged ~~mployer}." 355 FJd at 72. 
The NYLL's definitions are nearly identical to the FLSN s. See N.Y. Lab, Law § 
2(7); see also Garcia v. La Revise Assocs. LLC, No. 08 eiv. 9356 (LTS) (TRK). 2011 WL 
135009, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,2011). Coth'iS use the same tests to determine joint 
employment underhoth the l\TYLL and theFLSA Sec Paz v. Piedra~ No. 09 Civ. 03977 (LAK) 
(GWG), 2012 WL 121103) at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12~ 2012); f\-nsoumana v. Gristede·s Operating 
CorP., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
A. Formal Co.otro] Test 
1. Hiring. and Firingyo~ 
This factor focuses on the "the power to hire and fire," not whether that power 
was exercised. Se,e Carter, 735 F.2d at 12. The Black Swan Production Agreement required 
Searchlight's approval to hire key production staff, including the department heads where Glatt 
10 
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and Footman intemed.25 Though Searchlight did. not hire the lincproducers or department heads 
on Black Swan. it oflf:n did on other films with similar Production Agrccments.26 Searchlight's 
ability to hire: managerial staff is enough to satisfy tflis factor. See HCITllan, 172 F.3d at '! 40 
(Although Defendant's "hiring involved tnainly mana.gerial stan: the fact that [Defend.ant] hired 
individuals 'who were in charge of the [Plaintiffs] is a strong indication of controL"); Torres v. 
Gristede's Operating Com., No. 04 Civ. 3316 (PAC), 2011 WL 4571792, at *2 (3D.N.Y. Sept 
23,2(11) ("There is 110 evidence that [Defendant] hired any class member. but there does not 
have to be. It stands uncontradicted that he hired managt'!!iat employee-s."). 
Searchlighfs power to fire Black Swan production staffwas unbridled. 
Search1ig..~t reserved the right, "in its sole reasonable discretion,!' to "require (Lake of Tears} to 
dispense with the services of IDlY person rendering services with respect to [Black Swanj.'.27 
Because; Searchlight acquired the power to firc, it is irrelevant that Glatt was offered his 
intemship and Footman began his before Searchlight hecarn.e lnvo'!ved with mack Swan. GlatCs 
supervisor told Glatt he needed "to clear with the Fox production executive for interns to be 
working for free and geWrtg no college credits.~'28 
Defendants argue that Searchlight had the right to fire employees "Quly if certain 
conditions were met:,29 But Searchiight had. the right to require Lake of Tears to fire allY worker 
25 Decl. of Rachel Bien in SUpp. of Pis.' Mot. For Partial Summ. J .• dated Feb. 15,2013, ("'Bien SJ Decl.") (Docket 
Entry 1192). Ex:. 22 ("Production Agreement"). 
26 Dep. of Elizabeth Sayre dated Aug. 15,2012 ("Sayre 1'r.") 22:5-11; 53:5~55:12. The Caurtmay consider 
evidence of Searchlight's control over the productions of films otherthan Bl®k Swan, because as Defendants 
conceded, Searchlight's rights with resp~ct to the filnlS did llot diffennateria11y. May 10, 2013 Tr. at 52:23·53:4; 
~Z also t~illl.1Jlj 172 F.3d at B9 ("Since economic reality is determined based upon all the circulnstances, any 
relevant evl.dcl1cc may be examined so as to avoid having the test '::;on.fined to a narrow legalistic definition." 
(emphasis in original»). 
27 Production. Agreement (emphasis added). 
~s Bien SJ Dec!. Ex. 14. 
~9 Mem. of Law in Opp. to PIs.' Mot. for Pa."tial SUmll'l. J. ("Defs.· 8J Opp. Br.") (DocketEntry #118) at II. 
11 
Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG   Document 39   Filed 01/23/14   Page 37 of 86   Page ID #:342
at Searchlight's "sole reasonable discretion.,,30 Regardless. ~f(cJontrol may be restricted~ or 
exercised only occasionally~ without removing the employment relationship from the protections 
of the FLSA, since such limitations on control do not diminish the significance of its existence." 
IJern1ap, 172 F.3d at 139. 
2. Sc;:archlight's ,.~bi1ity to Supervis_~or Control W-.iltk Sch.~dules or Con4ition~ 
Searchlight closely supervised work on BlaQk Swan. The production sent 
Searchlight "crew lists" with the contact information for all staff, induding interns.31 
Searchlight required thc·m to send daily «call sheetst ' listing the scenes to be filmed the next day 
and the work schedules for all personnetJ2 The production also sent Searchlight daily "wrap 
reports" listing scenes scheduled to be fUmed that day. scenes actually filmed l and the hours 
worked by production employees.33 Searchlight Executive Vice President Elizabeth Sayre 
required production employees to call :he:r each morning to let her know what time filming began 
and again each evening to let her know wh.at time shooting wrapped.34 The production sent 
SearchHght weekly schedules and cost reports detailing expenses.35 It needed Searchlight's 
pennission to incur cost overruns.3ft 
Status as a joint employer "does not require continuous monitoring of employees, 
looking over their shoulders at an times.~' aC!JJlal1, 172 F.3d at 139. fn Renllat!, the Second 
Circuit afftmled the district co'Urt~ s finding that the defendant supervised and controlled 
employee work schedules where he "kept himself apprised of [] operations by receiving periodic 
__ .H._ ..... _ ... . __ .. ___ _ 
30 Production Agreement 
31 Sayre Tr. 78:1~79:1. 
32 Sa.yre Tr. 46:21-48:10. 
33 Sayre 'fr. 50:11-51:1, 81:15.·82:16, 
34 Sayre Tr. 82:3-22 . 
. 15 Sayre 'fr. 125: 1.22; Production Agreement; Bien SJ Dec!. Ex. 6 Ex. B, Ex. 27 . 
. i6 Sayre Tr. 177:22-179:5. 
12 
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reports from employees:' including phoning managerial employees '''reasonably frequently.') 
Herman, ! 72 F.3d at 137. 
3. Whethet:"oScarchlight Determjn..ed,Jhe Rate andMethod of Payment 
Searchlight set the overa.ll budget for Black Swan and set the allocations for each 
tine item.37 Gla.tt and Fooi:rnan argue that through its control of tile bud.get, Searchlight 'Ide 
facto" se;t wages for all production workers.J8 In B,uther::fonLFoQ..Q,Col'Q. v. M9Com~, 331 U.S. 
722 (1947), the Supreme Court held that a slaughterhouse jointly employed meat de-boners even 
though they were directly controlled by a bonin.g supervisor who contracted with the 
slaughterhouse. In Zhel1g. the Second Circuit discl.lsse.d Rutherford and noted that '''the 
slaughterhouse de factQ set the workers' wages, because the boners d~d no meat boning for any 
other finll and shared equaJly in the funds paid to the boning supervisor." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72. 
Here, the crucial factor of equally sharing wages is absent. An increase in the wages budget 
\vould not necessarily result in across the board raises; the production might have hired 
additional workers or increased pay to particular employees. 
But eVen though Lake of Tears hired Glatt, it needed Searchlight's pennission to 
have an unpaid i.ntem who was not receiving college credit. 31} Moreover, Searchlight withheld 
emptoyees' pay until tbey signed. Searclilight-approved employment agreements.40 While 
Searchlight may not have had the power to set employees' rate of pay, it was involved in their 
method of pay. Cf. Herman, 172 F.3d at 140 ("little evidence" showed defendant determined 
plaintiffs' rate of payment, "[bJut he did.participate in the method ofpaymenf'). 
~1 
. Sayre TT. 17:11-18:12. 
38 Mem. (If IAl:'N in Support of Pis.' Mot. For Partial Summ J. (''PIs.' 8J Bt'.") (Docket Entry #90) at 26 (citing 
Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72). 
5" Bien SJ Decl. Ex. 14. 
,10 Sayre Tr, 75:24-76:11; Bien Ded. Ex. 19. 
13 \141. 
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Searchlight required production staff to sign confidentiality agreements and 
employment agreements known as "deal memos." Moreover, Searchlight insisted that Black 
Swan employees sign revised deal memos it drafted even if they had signed memos before 
Searchlight's involvemcllC4! Searchlight did not aHow production employees to be paid until 
they signed one ofSearchiight's deal memos.42 After shooting \'.'rapped, SearchHght required 
Lake of Tears to send it the signed. memos.43 
Searchlight takes a narrow view, pointing out there is no evidence that Glatt, 
Footman, or a..'1Y other unpaid intern signed a deal m(~mo.44 But the fact that Searchlight required 
memos ftom the paid employees who. oversm;v the unpaid interns IS evidence of control over the 
intems, 
B. Functional Control Test 
A district court must "look beyond an entity's fonnal right to r.ontrol the physical 
performance of another's. work before d~,;clarii1g that the entity is not an employer under the 
FLSA." Zheng, 355 F.3d at 69. "[A]n en.tity can be ajoint employer under the FLSA even when 
it does not hire and fire its joint employees, directly dictate their hour.s, or pay them." Zheng, 
355 F.3d at 70. 
1. Whether Searchlight's Prcl11iS9S and Equipmentl¥m-e Used for Plaintiffs' Work 
Glatt and :Footman's internships were based at Lake of Tears' offices; which it 
leased before signing the Production Agreement with Searchlight.4~ There is n.o evidence either 
41 Bien SJ Decl. Ex. 21; Sayre Tr. 172:9-74:4, I !5:8-23. 
41 Sayre '1'r. 75:24.76:11;BiellDed. Ex. 19. 
4313iellDed. Ex. 42. 
44 Def..;,' SJ Opp. Dr. at 17. 
4$ Dep. of Alexander Footman, dated May 7, 2012 ("Footman Tr.") at 198:2~4. 
14 
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Glatt or Footman ever visited Searchlight offices or ust--d its equipment The fact that Lake of 
Tears' office space and equipment may have been renled or purchased in part by funds from 
Searchlight does not transform them into SearchHght's premises or equipment. 
2. Fftether Lak~9fTears Could Shift From One Putative Joint Ellw.loyer to Another ,. 
This factor is derived from ASJlthf!rford. where the plaintiff meat boners ·'had no 
business organization that could or did shift as a unit from one slaughterhouse to a.l1other." 
Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730. The Second Circuit observed this is relevant to joint employment 
"because a subcontractor that seeks business from a variety of contractors is less likely to be part 
of a subterfuge arrangement than a subc.ontractor that serves a single client." Zhong. 355 F.3d ~tt 
72. 
The Black Swan production could not shift from one film studio to a110Ll}er. The 
Production Agreement prohibited Lake of Tears from taking Black Swan elsewhere unless 
Searchlight aballdone.d the project or failed to advance funds.46 It is irrelevant that the 
Production Agreement did not prohibit Lake of Tears from workin.g on other projects. this 
ignores economic reality in the film industry~ where a film is produced by a singlcwpurpose entity 
whose operations cease after the film is made.47 
3. Extent to Which Plainti.f,'fs Perfonned a Discrete Line-Job That Was Integral to 
Sear~h1ight' s Process of Production 
In Rutherford. the meat boners' work was (';1 part of the integrated unit of 
production" at the siaughterhouse. Rutherford. 331 U.S. at 729. "Interpr{'1ed broadly, this factor 
could be said to be implicated in every subcontracting relationship, because aU subcontractors 
perform a function that a general contractor deems 'integral' to a product or service." Zheng, 
46 Production Agreement. 
47 ~Frank:H!l Tr. 16:5-14. 
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program.,,52 Intern recruiters Aimee Hoffman and Laura Wiggins oversaw internships at various 
FEG companies. 53 H.offman did not recru.it A11~alik. but when Fioffman became aware (If 
Antalik's intemship, she required Antalik to submit paperwork to continue her internship. 54 
Hoffman sent internship guidelines applicable to all FEG interns to Antalik's supervisor at 
Searchlight. 55 Hoffinan provided training to intern supervisors at PEG. 56 FEG exercised some 
control over interns' schedules at its subsidiaries by requiring interns to work between 16 and 24 
hours per week,. or 40 hours in the suw.r.net.57 And PEG r:.:aintaiued emploY111ent records and a 
personnel file for Antalik.5& 
This evidence raises factual disputes that preclude summary judgment in favor of 
the Defendants. 
Glatt and Footmar.:. move for summary judgment holding they were Hemployees" 
covered by the FLSA and NYLL and do not fall under the Htrainee~j exception established by 
Wll!ling v. Portlan4.Te[1l1inatCo., 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
In W',aUillg, a case involving a r.ailroad that held a week-long training course for 
prospective brakemen, the Supreme Court determined that "trainees" were not covered 
employeesund.er the FLSA. The trainees «[did] not displace any oithe regular employees, who 
52 Dec!. of Rachel Bien in Opp. to Defs.· Mot. for Summ. J, dated Mar. 29, 2013 ("Bien 8J Opp. Dec!.") (Docket 
Entry #140) Exs. 87, 99. 
53 Dep. of Aimt'}e Hoffman., dated Aug. 16,201 Z (I<Hoftinan It.") at 265:2-268:22. Defendants emphasize Hoffman 
was employed by fit'll( Group, New America Inc. and not by FEG. Decl. nf Aimee Hofflnan, dated Mar. 26,20 13 ~2 
(Docket Entry #U8). However. this does not preclude the pos!libility she administered a centralized FEG internship 
program. Her email si!,'llature lists her position as "FRO intern recruiter." Bien Class Cert. Ded. Ex. 22. 
S4 Bien SJ Opp. Decl. Ex:. 63. 
S5 Bien 8J Opp. Dec!. Ex. 95. 
56 • Blen SJ Opp. Decl. Ex. 86. 
57 Bien SJ Opp. Decl. Exs. 65, 78. 
58 Bien SJ Opp. Decl. Exs. 68, 69. 
19 
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[did] most of the work themselves, and must stand immediately by to supervise whatever the 
trainees do." Walling, 330 U.S. at 149·50. The trainees; work "[did] not expedite the comp,my 
business. but may, and sometimes [did}, actually impede and retard it." Walling, 330 U.S. at 
15 O. The Court held that the FLSA "cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose work 
serves only his own interest an employee of another person who gi ves him aid and 
instmction· ... the [FLSA] was not intended to penaliz.e [employer.s] for providing, free of 
charge, the same kind of instruction [as a vocational school] at a place and in a manner which 
would most. greatly benefit the trainee." )VaJHn~. 330 U.S. at 153, The Court concluded that 
"[a]ccepting the unchallenged findings here that the railroads receive no 'immediate advantage' 
from any work done by the trainees, we hold that they are not employees within the Act's 
A Department of Labor fact sheet helps f.o dt::termine whether interns at for-profit 
businesses faU within this exception. See U.S. Dep't of Labor Fact Sheet #71(Apri12010) 
C'DOLIlltern Fact Sheet"). The Fact Sheet notes that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the 
term 'suffer or permit to work' cannot be inte11)reted so as to make a person whose work serves 
only his or her own intc11~st an clnployec 0 f another who .provides aid or instruction, U It 
enumerates six criteria for determining whether an intemship may be unpaid: 
L The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the 
employer. is similar to training which would be given in an educational 
environment; 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3. The intern does not dispJace regular er'apioyees. but works under close supervision 
of existing staff; 
4. The e1l1ployer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the 
activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; 
20 
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5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; 
and 
6. The employer and the intem understand that the intern. is not entitled to wages for 
the time spent in the internship. 
"This exclusion from the definition of emplo)'llli.'mt is necessarily quite nan-ow because the 
FLSA) s definition of \ employ' is very broad." DOL Intern Fact Sheet. 
The Second Circuit has not addressed the "trainee" exception to the FLSA. 
Defendants urge that the DOL fa.crors art": not the applicable ~:tandard and that this Court should 
apply a "primary benefit test" by determining whether '''the intemship's benefits to the intern 
outweigh the benefits to the engaging entity .•• 59 
'While some Circuits have applied a ~'primary beneficiatyH test, it has little support 
ill Walling. The Supreme Court did 110t weigh the benefits to the trainees against those of the 
railroad. but relied on findings that the training progra.m served only the trainees' interests and 
that the employer received «no 'immediate advantage' from any work done by the trainees." 
Walling. 330 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). 
Thus, Wailing created a l'lan'Ow exception to an expansive defmition. "A broader 
or more comprehensive coverage of employees ... would be difficult to frame.H Unitecl Stptes v. 
Rosenwasserf 323 U.s. 360. 362 (1945). There is "no doubt as to the Congressional intention to 
S9 Defs,' 8J Opp. Br. at23. (citing SolifLi!:...1,gm:~lbroo1c Sanitarium & Sch.,I~) 642 F.3d 518,525 (6th Cir. 2011) 
("[T)he ultimate inquiry in a leamulg or training situation is whether the em.ployee is the primary beneficiary of the 
work performed."); Blair LVm~, 42(}F .3d 823, 829 (8th Crr. 2005) (finding students> chores at boarding schoo! 
were not work where they "were primarily for the stu<"~nts' ... benefit"); .~4£L~!:Hl}lHnJ:'. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 
1209 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[TJhe general test llsed to deterrr..i.ne if an. ert\pIcyee is entitied to the protectio.ns of the Ad is 
whether the employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees' Jabor."»; see also Velez v. 
Sanchez, 693 FJd 308, 330 (2d Cit. 2012) (in determining whether a plaintiff is a domestic service worker covered 
by theFLSA, "[a) court shou.ld also consider who is the primary recipient of benefits from the relationShip"). 
21 
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include aU employees within the scope of the Act unless specifically excluded." Courts should 
be cautious in expanding the "trainee" exception established in Walling. 
Moreover, a "primary bene£iciaryn test is subjective and unpredictable. 
Defendants' counsel argued the very sarne internship position might be compensable as to one 
intern, who took little from the. experience. and not compensable as t'? another, ',vho learned. a 
10t.60 Under this test, an employer could. never know in advance whet...lter it would be required to 
pay its interns. Such a standard is unmanageable. 
By contrast., the DOL factors have support in WaIHl;!g. Because they were 
promulgated by the agency charged with admm.istering the FLSA and are a reasonable 
application ofit, they are entitled to deference.6t .wang v. Hearst Corp., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2013 
WL 1903787, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2013) (citing!Init~,States v. Mead C,orp., 533 U,S. 218, 
234 (2001»). No single factor is controlling; the test "'requires consideration of aU the 
circumstances." Archie v. Gra.'ld Cent P'shiP., 997 F. Supp. 504, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also 
Wang, 2013 WL 1903787. at *4 C"[T]he prevailing view is the totality of the circumstances 
test."}. 
As noted above~ "since the NY LV s definition of employment is nearly identical 
to the FLSA's[,.1 courts in this circuit have held that the New York Labor Law embodies the 
same standard for employment as the FLSA." ~ano v. DPNY. Inc~, 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation and alterations omitted} The analysis for the trainee 
60 May 10, 20 t3 11'. 42:23-43:8. 
61 Defendants argue the DOL fa(;tors do not deserve deference because DOL opinion letters, which do not stem from 
"formal agency adjudication or noti'ce-and-comTncntrulema'king, are not binding authority." Def..'l.' SJ Opp. Br. at 
25 n.14. (q:uoti.ng j3arfield, '537 F.3d at 149). But even if not bindiog~ "such ag{~ncy kltters represent 'a body of 
experience ",nd informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort far guidance, '" Barfield, 537 
F.3d at 149 (quoting Q.!,!,gJ.?p.4.Ly, AdalM, 385 F.3d 2:~, 243 (2d Cir. 200-t)). inc DOL Intern Fact Sheet was issued 
it12010, but the same six factors "have appeared in Wage and Hour Administralor opinions since at least 1967." 
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot Dist., 992 F.2d 1023,1027 (IOthCir. 1993). 
22 
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showing' that they and potential opt~in plaintiffs 'together were victims of a common policy or 
plan that violated the law.'" Mvers, 624 F.3d at 555 (quoting Hoffmanll v. Shatto, Inc., 982 F. 
Supp. 249,261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
Courts apply "heightened scrutiny" to motions for court-authorized notice made 
after discovery. TOlT~.§~ 2006WL 2.819730, at *9. For post-discovery motions, (;ourts consider 
whether the plaintiff and proposed dass m.embers are "similarly situated" by considering "0) 
disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses 
available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and 
procedural considerations." Ton'es, 2006 WI.. 2819730, at *9 (internal alteration omitted) 
(quoting Thie,ssen v. Gen. ,Elec. CgtI?ital Q~i 267 F.3d 1095~ 1102 (10th Cir. 2001». 
Antalik moves for authorization to send notice of this action to 
all individuals who had unpaid internships bct\veen September 28. 2008 and 
September 1,2010 with one ormOfe of the foHowing divisions ofFEG: Fox 
Filmed Entertainment, Fox Group, Fox Netvvorks Gro'UPt and Fox Interactive 
Media (rcnanflcd News Corp, Digital Media). 
As discussed above~ Amalik has put forth generalized proofthat interns were victims ofa 
common policy to replace paid workers with unpaid interns. Though there are disparate factual 
and employment settings. the common issues ofliabiHty predominate over individual issues and 
defenses. See Torres, 2006 \VL 2819730, at '):10. And the same fairness and procedural 
considerations that make a class action a superior mechanism for th.e NYLL claims make a 
collective action a superior mechanism for the FLSA claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment that 
Gratts's CADCL claim is time~barred is granted, and the remainder of its summary judgment 
35 
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motion is denied. Glatt and Footman's motion for summary judgment that they are "employees" 
covered by the FLSAa.1ld NYLL and that Searchlight is their joint employer is granted. Gratts's 
motion for summary judgment is denied. Antalik's motions for class certification of her NYLL 
claims and conditional certification of an FLSA collective action are granted and the Jaw finn of 
Outten & Golden LLP is appointed as class counsel. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate 
the motions pending at ECF Nos. 89, 93, and 103. 
Dated: June J 1. 2013 
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Yelp! Terms of Service October 15, 2004 
By using the Yeip! Services (as defined below) which are owned and operated by 
Yelp! Inc. ("Yelp!ll) and by accessing the Yelp! Site located 
at http://www.yelp.com. and all linked pages owned and operated by Yelp! (the 
"Yelp! Site"), you agree to be bound by these Terms of Service (this 
"Agreement") . 
Yelp!'s on-line services which are available at the Yelp! Site will, among other 
things, help you find businesses/services you are looking for by allowing you to 
get recommendations from your friends, post and share these recommendations 
with your friends, and view third party postil1gs/recommendations regarding 
similar businesses/services ("Yelp! Service"), This Agreement sets out the legally 
binding terms with respect to your use of and our provision of the Yelp! Site and 
Yelp! Services. 
1. Eligibilitv_ You must be 18 or over to register as a member of Yelp! or use 
the Yelp! Site and Yelp! Services. Membership in the Yelp! Service is void 
where prohibited by applicable law, and the right to access the Yelp! Site is 
revoked in such jurisdictions. By using the Yelp! Site and/or Yelp! Services, 
you represent and warrant that you have the right, authority, and capacity 
to enter into this Agreement and to abide by all of the terms and conditions 
of this Agreement. 
2. Changes to the Agreement or the Yelp! Services. You agree and 
understand that this Agreement, the Yelp! Site and the Yelp! Services may 
be modified by Yelp! at any time without prior notice, and such 
modifications will be effective upon Yelp!'s posting of the new terms and/or 
upon implementation of the new changes on the Yelp! Site. 
3. Registration and Security. You may be required to register with Yelp! in 
certain circumstances and to select a password and user name, which shall 
consist of an email address you own and use ("User IDIl). If you register 
you agree to provide Yelp! with accurate, complete, and updated 
registration information. Failure to do so shall constltute a breach of this 
Agreement, which may result in immediate termination of your account. 
You may not: (i) enter, select or use a false name or an email address 
owned or controlled by another person with the intent to impersonate that 
person; or, (ii) use as a User ID a name subject to any rights of a person 
other than yourself without appropriate authorization. Yelp! reserves the 
right to refuse registration of, or cancel a User ID in its discretion. You shall 
be responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your password, 
4. Use of the Sate/Services by Members. You may use the Yelp! Site to 
solicit recommendations from, and share recommendations with, your 
Yelp! Terms of Service October 15, 2004 
1 
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1 DANIEL A. BERNATH, SBN 116636 
2 ussyorktowncvs10@yahoo.com 
FILED 
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
3 10335 sw Hoodview Drive 
.,12014 
4 Tigard OR 97224 
5 503.3674204 CENTRAL DISTAICT OF CALIFORNIA 
BY DEPUTY 
6 
7. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
- __ 12 
13 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CEl\TTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
Dr. Allen Panzer, ) CV13-070805-DDP-J'CG 
A:my Sayers, ) 
Lily J eung and ) Plaintiffs' Opposition to 
Darren Walchesky, on 'behalf of ) Special Motion to Strike 
14 . themselves and all others similarly) Complaint demanding wages 
15 situated, ) pursuant to Fair Labor Standards 
16 '. ) Act, and contract based cause of 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
Yelp, In 
Defend 
_~=~rni'l'1ill'YfFii"EoI ). action Quantum MeMlit, Request/o.,. 
} plaintiffs' attorney fees 
) 
) Febuary 10, 2014 
. \) 1.0:00 a.ifi. 
Dlsr-'-'" OF·(;Aqr-.<:i"'~!', ~.) Courtroom 3; 2 nd Floor L2J.._-------l .. ::.:.:.' '! ) Hon. Judge Dean D. Pregerson 
) 
25 COMES NOW PLAINTIFFS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
26 TO STRIKE CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION QUANTUM MERUIT based 
27 on their intentional misreading of the anti SLAPP statute. Request for 
28 attorney fees. This lawsuit has nothing to do with "Speech" but is routine FLSA 
29 action to get these plaintiffs their wages~ 
31 Daniel A. Bernath, Esq. January 10, 2014 
32 
PLAiNT~FfS OI?POSITION TO fRHVOLOUS $PECI.AL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTH-SLAPP MOTION) 
o 
• 
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Memoranduul of Points and Authorities ... 1 
Plaintiffs submitted their content with a reasonable expectation of 
compensation ... 4 
Defendant Yelp! was sued for Breach of Contract Type causes of action And 
not Defalnation as such, the anti-SLAPP statutes Do not apply ... 5 
The 9th Circuit repeatedly recognizes A cause of action for unjust 
enrichment ... 15 
Tasini v. AOL 851 F.SUPP2d 734 Is not a Fair Labor Standards Wage Case 
But investors who allegedly paid their share in product demanded a 
percentage ovvnership of Huffington Post .... 16· 
Plaintiffs are all vvriters for Yelp A.l1d unlike Wal-Malt v Dukes Do not have 
separate supervisors At separate stores who have discriminated In separate 
ways ... 17 
Yelp's at times cult like control of plaintiffs through social prestige, casual 
sex, hetro, homo, perverted, free liquor and demands of more labor from 
plaintiffs. .. .. 19 
California's anti SLAPP statute Procedural and not substantive ... 25 
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Barnes v. Yahoo ... 4.. 11 
Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard"er, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 977 ... 15 
First Nationwide Savings v. Perry 11 Cal.ApP.4th 1657 ... 15 
Creely v. HeR ManorCare ... 17 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight ... 4 
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 662 ... 13 
Larkin v. Ye~p ... 2, 3 
Larkin, Settlement Motion, page 3, Lines 7-9 Attached) ... 3 
Makaeffv. Trulnp, Univ. (11-55016 9th Cir 2013) ... 25 
1VIontez v. Pilgrirn Films & Television 08-56954 9th Cir. 2011 ... 15 
OrBrien V. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d at 584 .... 18 
Ochs V. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 CalApP.4th 782 ... 6 
Sliger et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC et al. ... 18 
Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734 ... 15 
Wal-MartvDukes ... 17 
Utility A.udit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2008 ... 1.1 
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33 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
34 Once again, Yelp is twisting settled law in the hopes that nobody will 
35 notice.1 Yelp is again sued in a run-of-the ruiU FLSA action with a pendent 
36 state court equity cause of action for contract/quantum meruit. Yelp twists 
37 this to say that 1u Yelp is on the internet, 
38 2. Plaintiffs have posted their labors For Yelp on the internet, 
39 2 .. Therefore, Yelp has i.rnm.unity from an FLS.A.lawsuit. 
40 Under Yelp's continual "twisted" legal reasoning flu, a Yelp CEO could 
41 spill his yogurt in the lobby and Yelp would be inlmune from a personal 
42 injury !av\Tsuit if the victinl also posted on Yelp. If Yelp stops paying its San 
43 Francisco landlord, Yelp believes that an anti SLAPP motion should get that 
44 contract cause of action dismissed. Yelp has just hit on this "twisty" 
45 strategy however, Earlier, when Yelp laborers in the sales department were 
46 not paid overtime and sued Yelp, Yelp didn't have the audacity to bring an 
47 anti SLAPP motion. Larkin v. Yelp (attached) Yelp was sued by laborers 
48 who they named "account executive trainee, junior a.c~, account executive 
I 49 and senior account executive. 
i 
1 On-April 26, 2013, after hearing sworn testhnony from a Yelp! s executive, 
Trial Ju.dge Peter S. Doft in San Diego California declared that Yelp! twists 
the law to make it say the exact opposite of settled legal principles .... I'm just 
stunned actually I mean, every single bit of settled law is twisted around by 
[Yelp! J. Everything is twisted around.~' 
PLAINTIFFS OIPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSNT'ION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOYION) 
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50 This is the same thing Yelp has done with its writers-calling 
51 some "Community Managers", "employees", "Scouts", "Elites", 
52 etc. but all doing the exact sanle labors for Yelp with some people 
53 paid wages and plaintiffs herein, not being paid wages. Plaintiffs herein 
54 provided reviews to attract an audience for defendant Yelp, said audience 
55 used as the basis for the salesman to make sales contracts with advertisers. 
56 Yelp's defenses to the Larkin FLSA action was not a frivolous anti SLAPP 
57 motion but ~'plaintiffs, have signed releases that prevent them 
58 from bringing" an FSIA lawsuit. Larkin, Settlement l\iotion, page 3, 
59 Lines 7-9 Attached) Yelp finally paid $1,250,000 to the unpaid salesmen as 
60 part of the settlenlent in that FLSA action. 
61 Yelp trots out the same frivolous defenses that laborers "agreed" to work 
62 for free and can't sue Yelp under the provisions of The Fair Labor 
63 Standards Act. Larkin Settlement I\-iotion. Rather than repeat the P and 
64 A's that hold Yelp's defense is frivolous, Plaintiffs invite the Court to look 
65 the Opposition to Strike where the lav,r is clear that a laborer cannot waive 
66 his or her rights under the FSLA. The T08 that Yelp produces, especially 
67 the so called Elite TOS were drafted by Yelp well after the emplo)'lnent 
68 relationship began (Indeed, the Elite 1'08 was drafted by defendant 
69 specifically to have this judge read it in this ITiOtion). 
PLAINT!FIFS OPPOSITION TO fRDVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OpPOS&TmON TO ANTD-SlAPP MOTION) 
N. 
Q) 
b.O 
CiS" P-. .. 
~.; .. ;";;ri: 
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70 PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED THEIR CONTENT WITH A REASONABLE 
71 IEXPECTATMON OF C:OMPIENSATION 
72 Yelp paid Community Managers, Scouts and paid for well over 200,000 
73 reviews; Yelp adn1its all these laborers were paid in wages. Plaintiffs have 
74 repeatedly pled that they were paid, as were the Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
75 plaintiffs, but as yet, not in FLSA required wages and not wages as Yelp has 
76 paid its hundreds of thousands of other writers [So ll1any reviewers were 
77 paid that Yelp admits to the SEC and FTC that it is beyond their ability to 
78 count. SEC filing byYelpJ. Complaint 6,9,10, 11, 12, Defendant again 
79 deceives this Court by falsely stating that at Compo 15-18 "used Yelp for 
80 social nernTorking." Plaintiffs say no such thing. Yelp is saying that because 
81 plaintiffs liked their job as \vr'iters that they should not be paid. Again, 
82 and of course, Yelp again gives no authority for such a proposition. 
83 This motion is 100% frivolous and and/or for the purpose of delay and 
84 plaintiffs should be reimbursed for their attorney fees to oppose it and to 
85 send Yelp the judicial equivalent of an email-such nonsense will not be 
86 tolerated in our Courts. 
87 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has emphatically stated that contract type 
88 causes of action cannot be reached by the anti SLAPP motion and there is 
89 no immunity for contract causes of action under the CDA. Barnes v. 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO fRiVOLOUS $PECDAL MOTION TO STRiKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION) 
.. 
,0.. 
", 
11 
-;. 
,~. 
" 
Case 2:13-cv-07805-DDP-JCG   Document 39   Filed 01/23/14   Page 54 of 86   Page ID #:359
90 Yahoo, infra. Yelp has repeatedly been given this 9th eire Case in Bernath v. 
91 Yelp in Oregon Circuit Court and in a letter to meet and confer requesting 
92 that Yelp withdraw their frivolous Special Motion to Strike. (attached) 
93 
94 DEFENDANT YELP! WAS SUED FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
95 TYPE CAUSES Of ACTION 
96 A.ND NOT DEFAMATION 
97 AS SUCHI' THe ANTI-SLAPP ·STATUTES 
98 Do NOT APPIL Y 
99 Defendant's motion is a disgrace, subn1itted by a new admittee to the 
100 California Bar, Shanti Michaels #277552 and a boiler plate motion that 
101 the so called CALIFORNIA ANTI SLAPP PROJECT has used again and 
102 again and again to burden the Courts and plaintiffs. Yelp demands this 
103 Court stretch this law; like a lower lip pulled over the Court's head. Yelp 
104 opinies that as PLAINTIFFS spoke on a public forum that the FLSA 
105 complaint must be disDlissed pursuant to the anti SLAPP statute. Yelp 
106 says that not paying wages is "conduct in furtherance ofllie 
107 exercise oftheuoconstitutional right offree speech." sic Motion 
108 p.ll, L10-12. That is gibberish and this Court should not turn a 
109 routine FSLA action into a mislabeled crusade to save "Free Speech. ') 
PLAINTIFfS OPPOSITBON TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSRTION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTBON) 
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126 j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
"To recover on a clanm 'for the reasonable value of services under 
a Quantum meruit theory, a plaintiff must establish both that he or 
she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request for 
services from the defendant and that the services rendered were 
intended to and did::....!b:.,:e=.n,,-,=e:..:..,:fi-=-.t ·~th:.;::;e_ defendantJ5 (Ochs v. PacifiCare of 
California (2004) i 15 Cal.App.4th 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734], internal 
citation omitted.) 
Plaintiffs have clearly pled the elements of quantum merit. There was an 
express request for services from the defendant. Conlplaint para. 16, line 
25, and on P.4, line 1; para. 17, Line 17-18; para. 18, Lines 4-5. The 
services were requested and "did benefit the defendant." Cropt para. 76. 
Yelp demands that plaintiff use its tools, wv.r.v.yelp.coll1 server and 
computer program, wear its logo on clothes, vvrist bands, hand out Yelp 
stickers, represent that they were enlployees of Yelp, Inc., follow its many 
rules or suffer "serious penalties" Com.plaint Para.52 1-25 and to wear Yelp 
gear to identify them as Yelp enlployees and/or laborers, entiiJing plaintiffs 
to wages, over and above the trinkets, bling and Yelp "undies". 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION! TO fRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTSON TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION) 
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127 
128 Yelpadnlissions on its website W\J\1w.Vclp.COlTI Yelprs logo is proudly 
129 called a 'Yelp!GASM". Demanding more labor, Yelp! instructs its 
130 writers, "Sounds like you need to get to writing some reviews 
131 there cowboy." (see decl of Bernath) 
132 
~1 for our Elite Events. 
I Velp SaM Ff'B1ICisco Shirt 255 printed 
1 
Where do you Yelp? You Yelp San 
Franciseo, don't you? e'mon.· Sure 
you do. SF is whare we ~1arted and 
c~ntinue to go strong. This si1.irt was 
pn~ted in a iimited run for our Frl5t big 
nol/day party. Oh my gosh, Y9U 
w~ren't there? It was MIl' like ttlfl 
coolest freaking party 011 the planet. 
You're so lame. 
Star Shirt . '.' , 
You rem€'mbe-r thiS shlf17 Dudt' H'l$ 
;.rlll' ";' uld "d~::wl Th!· ... w:,S the hr;.;~ 
i 
i 
I 
f 
PlLAlNTlfFS OPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
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133 Requests by defendant to provide more services and attend its business meetings 
134 and wear and identify as defendant's agents and/or employees. Business meeting 
135 with free liquor" ••• for our first big holiday party. Oh my gosh, you 
136 weren't there? It was like the coolest freaking party on the planet. 
137 You're so lame.'~ 
PLAINTiFFS OPPOSITION TO FR.iVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTZON) 
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139 
140 
PlAMN'f~FFS OIl'lPOSrnON 10 fi-UVOLOUS SPIECIAL MOTION 10 STRIKE 
(CpPOSmTIONl T~ ANTi-StAPP MO"ll'~ON) 
.?: 
.... ;W, 
.,\ .. 
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141 "**Please note that Yelp! in the url 
142 line calls them "lIDdie§l~' but in the picture calls them "hot shorts" 
PQ./.\SNTmIFFS OIfPPOSSTIION TO FtiUVOLOUS $PiECIAL MOTION i@ STl!UKE 
(OPPOSITION 1'0 ANT~-StAPP MOTION) 
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144 'As Witkin states in his text, "[a] common count is proper whenever 
145 the plaintiff claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in 
146 a sum certain, or for the rea~(mab!e value of ~ervices, goods, etc., 
147 furnished. It makes no difference in such a case that the proof shows 
148 the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied in 
149 fact, or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and received can be 
150 based upon money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void 
151 contract, or a performance by one party of an express contract." (Utility 
152 Audit Co" Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 Cal.AppAth 950, 958 [5 
153 CaLRptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.) 
154 Yelp! attelnpts to bring an ... !\NTI SLAPP nlotion as a sort of sUlnmary 
155 judgment motion with no evidence by the moving party. But it cannot meet 
156 the preliminary requirements of the statute. Yelp! can't obtain a motion to 
157 strike on an alleged ANTI STR..t\..TEGIC IAvVSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC 
158 PARTICIPATION because Yelp 1 is being brought to the bar of justice for 
159 breach of contract and quasi-contract causes of action Quantum Meruit and 
160 Unjust Enrichment. 
161 On 11ay 7, 2009 - The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
162 court's order dismissing the case. The appellate court determined that 
PLABNTIFFS OPPOSITION TO fRBVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
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163 plaintiff s case could proceed to trial because plaintiffs allegations nlight ~, 
165 
166 
168 
170 
support a claim for contract-like promissory estoppel and held that the 
Communications Decency Act § 230 would not preempt the contract 
related claims Barnes v. Yahoo! 570 F. 3d 109~ 
ht.tp: /ltinyurl.com/lp4izr6 case text 
insofar as Barnes alleges a breach Qfcontract claim under 
the theory qfp1"omissoryesiopi~el,subsection 230(c)(1) a/the 
Act does not preclude h.cl"cau.seof action.. (Op. at 5335) 
171 As we indicated above, Barnes' complaint could also be read to base 
172 liability on section 90 of the Restatel1'lent (Second) of Contracts, 
173 which describes a theory of recovery often known as promissory 
174 estoppel. .... 
175 Such, then, is the promise that promissory estoppel requires: one that the 
176 promissor intends, actu.ally or constructively, to induce reliance 
177 on the part of the promisee. From such intention courts infer the 
178 intention that the promise be legally enforceable. Thus, when A 
179 sues B for breach of eontract, A is alleging that B violated an obligation that 
180 B intended to be legally enforceable. In promissory estoppel cases, courts 
PLAINTifFS OPPOSITION TO FRaVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION YO ANTI-SLAPP MOTDON) 
Q 
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181 silnply infer that intention not from. consideration but from a promise that 
182 B could have foreseen would induce A's reliance. 
183 B Against this background, 'we inquire "\.vhether Barnes' 
184 theory of recovery under [quasi contract] promissory 
185 estoppel would treat Yahoo as a "publisher or speaker" 
186 under the Act. 
187 As we explained above, subsection 230(c)(1) precludes liability when 
188 the duty the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the 
189 defendant's status or conduct as a publisher or speaker. In a 
190 promissory estoppel case, as in any other contract case, the 
191 5luty the defendant alle ... ~edly ~i.ob.Jed springs from ~ 
192 ~ontract- an enforceable promise--not from. any non .. 
193 contractual conduct or capacity of the defendante See GTE 
194 CorpG, 347 F .. ad at 662 ('9Maybe [the] lllaintiffs would have a 
195 better arg\unent tha-[5 l;'-1:I its cOin.:tr'ucis 000, [the defendant] 
196 assumed a duty to protect them 0 91). Barnes does not seek to 
197 hold Y M.OO liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party 
198 content~ but rather as the coupter:narty to a contract, as a 
199 nromisor ,\Tho has brea~hed. 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSJTION TO FRgVOLOUS SPIECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
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200 
201 Prolnising is different {from publishing type actions} 
202 because it is not synonym.GUS with tbe performance of the 
203 action promised. That is; whereas one cannot undertake to do 
204 . something without simultaneously doing it, one can, and often 
205 does, promise to do something 'without actu.ally doing it at 
206 the same 'tune. Contract liability here would COlne not frOln Yahoo's 
207 ll,ublishing conduct. but from Yahoo's Inanifest intention to be legally 
208 obligated to do something, ...... Contract law treats the outwardly 
209 111anifested intention to create an expectation on the part of another 
210 as a legally significant event. That event generates a legal duty distinct 
211 from the conduct at hand, be it the conduct of a Pllblisher, of a doctor, 
212 or of an overzealous uncle.oo 
213 footnote 14 All the same, 'we believe the distinction we draw is sound. 
214 Though pronlissory estoppel lurks on the sometirnes blurry boundary 
215 between contract and tort, its promissory character 
216 distinguishes it from torte That character drives our 
217 analysis here andplacf!:!!J1rontissoMI estowe1.beyond the 
218 
219 
reach qfsubsection 230(c)(11 
PLAINTIFfS OPPOSITION TO FRfiVOLOUS $PEC!AL MOTION TO STRU{E 
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220 
221 Therefore, we conclude that, in.sofar as Barn~s alleges a breach 
222 of contract clahn under the theory of promissory estoppel, 
223 subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does n~eclude her cause 
224 of action~, {Emphasis added} 
225 The 9th Circuit repeatedly recognizes 
226 A cause of action for unjust enrichment 
227 Earlier, we recognized that a clairn for unjust enrichment is 
228 essentially equivalent to a claim of copyright infringement and is 
229 therefore preempted. See Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard-er, 
230 Inc., 820 F .. 2d 973, 977 (9th eire 1987), overruled on 
231 other grounds by Fogerty v,. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
232 
233 Montez v. Pilgrim Films & Television 08-56954 9th eire 2011 
234 See also First Nationwide Savings v. Per!") 1.1 Cal.ApP.4th 1657 for 
235 cause of action of Unjust Enrichlnent. 
237 Tasini v. AOL 851 F.Supp 2d 734 
Is not a Fail" Labor Standards 'V age Case 
PLAINTifFS OPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPIECIAL MOl'lON TO STRII(E 
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239 But investors who allegedly paid their share in product 
240 demanded a percentage ownership of I-Iuffington Post 
241 The trial court in Platt v. Fox Searchlight is analogous to this case, There, 
242 the laborers provided the services and the Court ordered the movie 
243 compa.ny to pay in wages and not just in bling, swag, attendance at Wrap 
244 Parties and prestige2 • In Tasini, the plaintiff did not seek his wages or their 
245 equitable equivalant but under equity, he denland a piece of the company. 
246 Tasini complaint para. 99 " ... ,at least $105 minion in the Merger 
247 Consideration recognized by [defendants) is due to the value created 
248 by the content provided by Plaintiff and the Classes and the value 
249 created by Plaintiff and the classes ... if 
250 prayer at c. damages equal to the benefit bestowed on the 
251 Defendants ... not less than $105,000,000" 
252 http://tinyurl.comLma.gwfym 
253 Tasini pled t.hat he labored for 1050 hours for Huffington Post and 
254 denlanded $105 Inillion, thus he was either oem.anding $100,000 an article 
2 Yelp stands alone in American Industry in issuing Yelp panties to its 
workforce (see below). 
PI!.AIINTRFFS Of'POSITHO~ 1'0 FfUVOLOUS $PECtiAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
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255 or he was demanding his share of the enterprise as a founding member. He 
256 must have been demanding his piece of the company as quantum merit 
257 requires a reasonable demand and. no writer gets paid $105,000,000 for 
258 1050 hours of labor. If Tasini had merely sued for 1050 hours work at 
259 minimum wage, he would have won the case as did Glatt v. Fox 
260 Searchlight.. But he asked for about l/3 (lfthe entire cOlnpany as a part 
261 m;mer! Therefore, Tasini 2012 is distinguished and GIattt v. Fox 
262 Searchlight 2013 should be this Court's guide. 
263 Plaintiffs are all "Writers for Yelp 
264 And unlike Wa!-IVlartv Dukes 
265 Do not have separate supervisors 
266 At separate st<noes ,\Th.o have discriminated 
267 In separate 'ways 
268 Defendant is confused again. WalIVlart does not apply. 
269 Since the Supreme Court's decision "vas rendered, the majority of 
270 courts that have addressed Dukes' application to 216(b) collective 
271 actions have held that Dukes does not apply to 216(b) collection 
272 actions. In CreelYI v. HeR ManorCare, the court considered the 
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I 
1 
273 hnpact of Dukes on the FLSA action pending before it and concluded 
274 that it did not apply. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77170, *3, 6 (N.D. Oh. 
275 .July 1, 2011). In so doing~ the court reasoned. that the Dukes decision 
276 turned on Rule 23(a)(2)'s "conlll1onaJ.it")I''' requirement, however, 
277 under Sixth Circuit law, Rule 23(a)(2)'s "commonality" requirement 
is distinct fro In the FLSA's "similarly situated" requirement as the 
279 Sixth Circuit has "expressly declin[edJ to apply Rule 23's standard to 
280 FLSA claims." Id. at 7:"4 citing O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 
281 
282 
283 
284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
290 
291 
292 
F.3d at 584. In the Sixth Circuit, 
FLSA collective action plaintiffs have been deemed similarly situated where 
"their clairns were unified by eOn1111On theories of defendants' statutory 
violations," even though "proof of a violation as to one particular plaintiff 
[did] not [necessarily] prove that the defendant violated any other 
plaintiffs rights." Id. citing O'Brien at 585. Furthermore, the Creely court 
determined that Dukes' gender-based Title VII claims were fundamentally 
distinct" from the FLSA claims before it since the FLSA claims before it 
"[did] not require an examination of the subjective intent behind millions 
of individual employrnent decisions," rather, :'the crux of [FLSA] case [was] 
whether the company-wide policies~ as inlplemented, violated [p]laintiff.s' 
statutory rights." The court in Sliger et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC et al. 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSiTKON TO FRDVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
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293 also refused to extend Dukes' Rule 23 analysis to FLSA collective action 
294 certification determinations, rejecting the defendant's argument that Rule 
295 23's commonality standard and the "similarly situated" standard of 216(b) 
.() 
296 are "entirely consistent." 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94648, * 7-8, n. 25 (E.D. 
297 Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). 
298 Rather, after citing a string of cases holding that Rule 23 class action 
299 standards are distinct from 216(b) collectiv~ action standards, the court f 
300 declined defendant's invitation to apply DukeS to the FLSA collective action 
301 certification analysis as doing so would be "inconsistent with the Ninth 
302 Circuit's apparent view that :the Rule 23 standards should not be , 
303 used." Id at *4-5. 
304 CERTIFICATION - 2l6(b) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS v .. RULE 23 ClASS 
305 ACTIONS & ENTERPRISE COVERAGE UNDER THE FLSA Wage & Hour 
306 Boot Camp ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 11.2-5.11 
30 7 
308 Yelp's Control and Right to Control Plaintiff VvTiters 
309 YELP'S AT TIMES CULT UKE CONTROL OF PLAU'llTMFfS THROUGH 
311 Il.IQUOR AND DEMANDS Of MORE LABOR FROM PLAINTIFFS. 
312 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO IFRDVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOYBON) 
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313 
314 
P!l.AANTIFfS OPPOSiTION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
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315 
316 "undies" is in the URL 
317 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSB'nON TO FtlUV'OlOI'JS $P~CU\l MOTION TO STRIKE 
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318 o).c*Please note that Yelp! in the urlline calls them "undies" but in the 
319 picture calls them "hot shorts" 
320 
321 
PLAINT!FIFSOPPOSITION TO FRftVOLOUS SPEceAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOS~TiON TO ANTU-SlAPP MOTION) 
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322 
323 Attached exhibits (slap pictures in Opposing an anti SLAPP motion 
:324 and pillow fight with Yelp executive, caption "make me Yelp"; 
325 Yelp!'s logois proudly called a "Yelp'!ga§m~). Demanding more 
326 labor; Yelp! instructs its -writers, "Sounds like you need to get to 
327 writing some reviews there cowbo)!." 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO FRIVOLOUS SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE 
(OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SlAPP /MOTION) 
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328 
329 Social pressure on the free writers to ad.here to the social pressure 
330 from Yelp! and its gatherings with free liquor 'G u.for our first big 
331 holiday party. Ok my gosh~ you weren~t there? It was like 
333 
.... ' .. , .. " .. ; .. ~i1~Jllfi~; .... ' •. . . . 
COUSIIJ trunks that . ....... '.' 
player, ;YQtNe\ftriting about that" .' '. " 
Totally, These suckers wer~ han~d . 
out at our HCit Summer Nights part)4. 
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334 "That's totally going in my review" Criminal Intimidation 
335 rrlessage sent froin Yelp!, through its non-wage paid labor to the 
336 merchant to either give free food, pay cash to the reviewer, buy 
337 protection/advertising or face a scathing business destroying review. 
338 Yelp! encourages its free laborers to criminally threaten merchants 
339 and gives this Court documentary evidence of its extortion tactics. 
340 
341 
342 PROCEDURAL AND NOT SUBS,. ANTIVE 
The Chief and another justice on the Ninth Circuit have indicated that 
couli should revisit its prior decisions on \vhether the California anti-
SLAPP act applies in federal court. The majority of 9th Circuit justices, 
discussing rigorous requirements of class actions but not the permissive 
requirements of collective actions specifically found in and distinguished in 
the Fair Labor Standards A.ct and denied an en bane hearing. 
The guiding statements came earlier in Makaeftv. Trump. Univ. (11-55016 
9th Cir 20131 httP.=/ltinyurtconl/khbztba In that lawsuit, Makaeff 
brought a class action (not a ~on~ctive action) against Trump University, 
alleging that it engaged in deceptive business practices. 
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353 According to' Chief Ju.dge Kozinski: 
354 The anti-SLAPP statute creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a 
355 procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights. The language of the 
356 statute is procedural:. Its Inainspring is a "special motion to strike"; it 
357 contains provisions limiting discovery; it provides for sanctions for parties 
358 who bring a non-meritorious suit or nlotion; the court's ruling on the 
359 potential success of plaintiffs claim is 110t "admissible in evidence at any 
360 later stage of the case"; and an order granting or denying t.l].e speciai lTIotion 
361 is inlmediately appealable. 
362 Because state rules of procedure have no effect in federal court, according 
363 to Chief Judge Kozinski, "this is the beginning and the end of the analysis, 
364 "[t]he California anti-StAPP statute ellis an ugly gash through 
365 this orderly p:rocess'~ Judge Paez wrote "I agree that California anti-
366 SLAPP statute is 'quintessentially procedural' and its application in federal 
367 court has created a hybrid m.ess that now rese~mbles neither the Federal 
368 Rules nor the original state statute)) 
370 
371 
372 Daniel A. Bernath, attorney for plaintiffs 01.10.2014 
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From: Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer 
To "aschur@yelp.commg@casp.net 
1.t.14 at 9:53 AM 
To Mark Goldowitz, 
Paul Clifford, 
Shanti Michaels 
Evan Mascagni 
Aaron Shur, 
This lettel' is a demand that you withdraw your frivolous Anti Slapp motion to strike a common 
count. 
Common count, also known as quantum meruit, is based in contract. 
• "To recover on a claim for the reasonable value of services under a quantum meruit 
theory, a plaintiff must establish both that: he or she was acting pursuant to either an 
express or implied request for services from the defendant and that the services 
rendered were intended to and. did benefit the defendane~ (Ochs v. PacifiCare of 
California (2004) 115 Cal.A.pp.4th 782, 794 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 734], internal citation omitted.) 
• " 'As Witkin states in his teXt, "[a] common count is proper whenever the plaintiff 
claims a sum of money due, either as an indebtedness in a sum certain, or for the 
reasonable value of services, goods, etc., furnished. It makes no difference in such a case 
that the proof shows the original transaction to be an express contract, a contract implied 
in fact, or a quasi-contract." , A claim for money had and re.ceived can be based upon 
money paid by mistake, money paid pursuant to a void contract, or a performance by one 
party of an express contract." (Utility Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 
Cal.AppAth 950," 958 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 520], internal citations omitted.) 
You are well aware of the case Barnes v. Yahoo where the 9th Circuit Court has at least three times 
stated that contract based causes of action are not reachable by anti slapp motions. 
Therefore, I shall point out to the Court your frivolous motion, which intentionally ignores Barnes 
v. Yahoo and your "special motion to strike" which you have used to bypass the well established rule 
that a demurrer must not include addition evidence outside of the. complaint. You have, for 
exatnple, put in a so called Rules for Elites that you drafted well after my clients had performed their 
as yet unpaid labors for you. 
I send you this letter to meet and confer with you to urge you to withdraw your frivolous motion to 
strike. 
Daniel A. Bernath, Lawyer 
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peter Rukiu (SBN 178336) 
RUKIN HYLA!\Tl) DORIA & TINDALL LLP 
100 Pine Street, Suite 2150 
p San Francisco, CA 94111 
·1' Telephone: (415) 421-1800 I Facsimile: (415) 421-1700 I E-mail: petell.ukin@rhdtlaw.com 
I Rosa Vigil-Gallenberg (SBN 251872) GALLENBERG PC 
9701 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1000 
Beverly Hills, CA 90071 
Telephone: (310) 295-1654 
Facsi.mile: (310) 733-5654 
Email: rosa@gallcnberglaw.coll1 
Ian J\,1cLoughlin (pro hac vice appiication to be filed) 
Tom UmlY (pro iliac vice application to be filed) 
SHAPIRO H.ABER & URMY LLP 
53 State Street 13th Floor 
Boston, IvIA 02109 
Telephone: (617) 439-3939 
Fc'lcsimile: (617) 439-0134 
E-mail: theyman@shulaw.com 
II Attomeys for Representative Plaintiffs 
II 
I tJNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTIiERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
JUSTIN LARKIN, ANTHONY TIJERINO, and I AHMAD DEANES, on behalf ofthemseIves and I an others simi.larl:y situated, 
I Plaintiffs, 
I v. I YELP! INC., 
I 
Defendant. 
Case No. 3:11-cv-01503-EMC 
PLAINT!FFS' NOTICE OF MOTION 
A.~D MEMORANDUM 01? POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION f'OR PRELIMINARY 
APPROVAL OF CLASS AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT 
Date: June L 2012 
Time: 1:30 p.m. 
Com1room: 5 _17th Floor 
Judge: HOll. Edward M. Chen 
I 
I PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION ISO. PRELIMINA..l~Y APPROVAL Case No. 3:1 i .CY-01SO.'-EMCI 
I 
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1 I. INTRODUCTION 
2 'I Plaintiffs Justin Larkin, Anthony Tij.;,rino, and Ahmad Deanes (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") 
3 I se'ek preliminalY approval of this proposed class and collective action settlement Plaintiffs entered 
4 on behalf ofthemse1ves and the proposed Class of Account Executives employed by Yelp! Inc. 
5 '("Defendant or "Yelp"), which will provide for a maximum settlement payment of$1,250,000 in 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
retml1 :for a release and dismissal with prejudice of the claims asserted against Yelp in this action. 
I The net settlementfhnd will be disuibuted to Participating Class Members based on the number of 
II 
I 
,I 
II r 
I 
work weeks Clas~i Membel'~ w<)rl~ed dmi.ng the relevant class period. 
Plaintiffs mId Class Members worked as Account Executives for Yelp. During the relevant 
dass period, Yelp cla.ssified Account Executives as exempt from the overtime requirements of 
federal and state law and paid them at a straight-time rate of pay rather than an ovel1ime rate of pay 
for the overtime hours that they worked. Plaintiffs challenged this pay practice 011 the groilllds that 
Yelp's classific.afion ofits Account Executi.ves as exempt Vi'as unlawfhl because these employees 
did not faU iuto the commissioniinstde sales ex.emptioll, the administrative exemption, or allY other 
knovVll exemption. 
The proposed Settlement is fair and reasonable in Ii?)'!t of the risks Plaintiffs and Class 
Members faced ill connection with the class certification, liability, and damages phases of this case 
I and the value of the claims should Plaintiffs prevail. Plaintiffs contend that Yelp cannot seriously 
II dispute the alleged misdassification of ACcOlmt Ex.a-cutives, which lies at the heart of this case, as 
there is no colorable exemption defense. However, Plaintiffs face several potential procedural 
hurdles. Specifically, Yelp contends that ovcltime claim releases signed by some putative cla~.s 
members in March. 2011, a class action prohibition policy promUlgated by Yelp in Feblllary 2011 
signed by a m?Jority of Class Members, and severance agreement releases signed by fCImer 
employees (including the tvvo California-based named Plaintiffs) will bar the participation of the 
vast majority of potential class memb{;rs. A detennination thatthe releases and/or the class action 
waiver are vpJid would significantly nan'ow fue scope of the case and/or present a potential barrier 
to recovery for many Class Members. 
1 II 
IIP1.AINTIFrs' MPA ISO P;.:u;:I,IMINARY A?PROVAL Case No. 3:11-e\'-OI503-EMC 
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To avoid that risk, Plaiutitls' counsel have negotiated a Settlement that creates a maximlUl1 
II settlement ffillount of$I,250,000. Pbintiffs' counsel believe that this Settlement-·negotiated 
I extensivelv and at ann's length '''ljth the assistance of an eXI)erienced mediator--is a fair and i" _. 
! reasonable resolution of the claims against Yelp in jigllt of the risks Plaintiffs face if this matter 
'I proceeds to trial. Accordingly, Plainti11s respectfhIly request ('hat this Court: (1) grant preliminary 
, approval of the proposed settlement; (2) conditionally certify for settlement purposes a National 
I Settlement Class; (3) conditionally certify a Califcmlia Class for settlement purposes; (4) approve 
II the fonn, content, and method of distribution of the Notices ,md Proof of Claim fOlUlS; (5) appoint 
II Simpluris, Inc. ("Silnpluris'), as the Claims Admiulstrator pursnallt to the Settlement Agreement; 
(6) appoint Ru.kin Hyland Doria & Tindall LLP, Gallenberg PC, and Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP 
. as settlement Class Counsel~ and (7) schedule a hearing regarding final approval of the proposed 
settlement ffild Class Cotmse!'s request for attomey's fees, costs, and incentive award payments. 
I II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
,I 
A. Factual Background and the Parties' Contentious 
Yelp is a San Fnmcisco·"based company t:vhich operates a social networking a11.1 user 
I 
I review website. Yelp generates revenue through the sale of advertising and uses inside sales 
I personnel, called "Account Executives," to secure its advertising business. Account Executives 
I work under different titles, depending on their experience and seniority: account executive trainee, 
jttnior account .executive, acc(mnt executive, or senior aCC(Hmt executive. Regardlesf. of title, a11 
Account Executives have the same core responsibility 1:0 sell Yelp'S advmtising products. 
! From the begimling of its operations until approximately March 2011, Yelp classified its 
I ~CCOl.~t Executives ~s ~xempt from f~deral and st~te OVe~il11.e.laws .. Yelp paid all Account . 
I Executives under a s1l11llar compensatIon plan durmg the lIabIlIty penod. Although some detalls 
! varied, all ACCOlUlt Executives received a base salary and Iud the ability to earn additional 
I eompensation or to move to a higher leVel of compensation bas(~d on pedonnan.ca. 
Each ofthe Ptaintiff.') INorked for Yelp as an Account Executive. Docket NiUnber ("Dkt 
No. ") 4, at ~. 9-11. Plaintiff Lat'kin worked in Yelp'S San Francisco office fro111 September 2008 to 
II PLAINTlHS' MFA ISO .PRELIMiNAR.Y APPROVAL 
II I. 
2 
Case No. 3:11"t'l'·01503·EMC 
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1
l\.·hU'Ch 2009 and Plaintif~Tijerino worked in the San Francisco office fi·OlU Febru<:lty 2010 through 
I
I November 2010. ld. at 119-10. PlaintiffDeanes worked out of Yelp's Scottsdale, Arizona office 
II II'om October 2010 to January 20U. ld. ar 4! 11. 
I! Plaintif£." cOlltend that Yelp misc1assitled its Account Executives as exempt fi'om overtime, II I' and that, on the basis ofthis exempt classification, v:{eJp did not pay A':;:COlmt Executives the 
I overtimCl wages required uuder the FLSA or Califomia law. 
Yelp contends that Plaintiffs' claims have no merit. Yelp asserts that the majority of class 
, members, including hvo oftlle named Plaintiffs, have signed releases that preven.t them from 
II' bringing the claims asserted in this la:wsuit. Yelp also claims that many class menlbers have agreed 
to pursue any claims that tIley may have individually rather than on a class or collective action 
I basis, effectively precluding them fi-om pru:ticipating in tins action. 
B. Procedural History 
On March 29,201 i, PlaintiffJustin Larkin filed this action ill the United States District 
damages, and restitution. Dkt. No. 1. 
On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff Justin Larkin provided notice to the Califomia Labor and 
Workforce Development Agency and Yelp in accordance v.,ith the procedures set forth in the 
Califomia Labor Code's Private Attomeys General Act, Labor Code § 2698 ct. seq. (PAGA) of111e 
21 On April 19, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding two additional plaintiffs, 
22 Anthony Tijerino and Ahmad Deanes. Dkt. No.4. 
23 On May 11, 201], the patties executed an agreement tolling the FLSA statute of limitation 
24 for all potential collective action members effective May 11,2011. Declaration of Peter Rukill In 
25 Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement 
26 I ("Rukin Decl.") ~ 7. On May 20, 2012, the parties executed a stipulation requesting a stay oft110 
27 'I proceedings pending mediation and pernlitting the filing of a second amended complaint adding a 
28 I 
3 
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1 DANIEL A. BERNATH, SEN 116636 
2 ussyorktowncvsl0@yahoo.com FILED 
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 3 10335 sw Hoodview Drive 
4 Tigard 0 R 97224 
.'72014 
.- 5 503.367042 04 
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
BY DEPUTY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
Dr. Allen Panzer, ) CV13-070805-DDP-JCG 
i\my Sayers, ) 
Lily Jeung a:n.d ) Declaration of Daniel A. Bernath 
Darren 'Valchesk~, on behalf of ) in opposition to frivolous anti SLAPP 
themselves and all others similarly) for wages 
situated, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Yelp, hie. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RECEIVED SUT NOT FILED 
CLEBK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
.c; ~ I 7 201.4 
) Febuary 10, 2014 :::rb.~_.,, ___ ~ 
) 10:00 a.ill. CENTAALDiSTR~rCAL1~ir:.·· 
) Counll.'OOUU 3, 2 nd Floo y ... ~~-~, '0."' __ .J 
l Hon. Judge Dean D. Pregersoll 
) 
I have examined the public display by defendant Yelp, Inc., located on a server, and 
connected on my computer in Tigard Oregon to their computer. 
1. There was no "Terms of Service for Elites" until I informed Anthony Mcnamer, Yelp's 
attorney, that I was filing a lawsuit against Yelp on behalf of Elites. Thereafter, Yelp, 
Inc. then published a document entitled TOS for Elites. However, a search of Yelp. com 
32 in the archive of the internet, found at wvv'1v.archive.org and VlTwvv.waybackrnachine.org 
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I 
~ 
33 shows that this so caned document did not exist ip. the relevant time period of plaintiffs' 
34 labors for Yelp. 
35 
36 Therefore, Yelp) Inc. produced this so called document just to be read by this 
37 .~and for tb.i~ Inotion and is not relevant and as it is manufactured evidence, 
38 must be disregarded. 
39 2. Yelp also produces a so called Terms of Service. However, it appears Plaintiffs began 
40 working for Yelp in 2009 or earlier and the manufactured evidence of a 2013 or 2014 
41 "Terms of Service", purporting to be an agreement, should be disregarded as more 
42 "evidence" produced by defendant Yelp, Inc. for this judge to read, in this lawsuit and 
43 for these motions. (Yelp wrist band, beer bottle opener, pill container) 
44 
45 
~, 
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47 I have examined the defendant's publishing and have found that they demand that their 
o 
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48 non wage paid employees write more and more reviews or suffer social ostracism . 
• • • ,' •••••• ': :~.h.hh.h~ • ''''" .. """",,- ••• vy •• *. 
h "< , .... ,~~~ Y"'W'~'A 
Limlted Edition Yelp Erlte Te~~ ~~::I~~~"'::~ Ef~e E 
Yelp Burs.·.:t··. s· .· ....... · ··.·.·rt:.· ... . . f'" ~ ~ l1Jmi.'f;'(j f::)fCi(/s{I.t'el,'< if){ 'l'pln J::.'1ifoe,. I \.1: .. e.
'n
.· , :., 1: ~ .. ~ . -,.. .. !·ii' tA_.Ix(.r;: l' 'lIp ! 
49 
ies been c aUed a fl'ow€w, a windmill a 
yeJpgas01, but la·s·the BlATs! Jt'SSDrt 
of~he abstract embo.diment ofwnat 
wntlog' a Yelp review is;, part 
exclamation pornt, pal1 pop, the 8uf'st 
mak.es Yelp '~vh~t it IS. Not EJite? 
T (Hj~h cookie Sounds flke "IOU net:d 
h') get ~o vvrmrl9 S1)me feV!e'~!i/s theH~, 
G0'.vboy . 
Tt):;!U'~ To,tally G'Oiflg in I'ny Review Shirt :,.",~~, ') 
C'a~o~I' LrKe, )1t;)U .kn(lW 'y'oll~it~ tQtanv 
50 Yelp admissions on its website :wvvV\7.yelp.com Yelp!'s logo is proudly 
51 called a "Yelp!gasnl~'.Den1anding more labor, Yelp! instructs its 
52 writers, "Sounds like you need to get to writing some reviews 
53 there cowboy. " (Free T Shirt to Elite writers stating that if they don't attend 
M 
ill. 
b.O 
rn 
0..' 
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54 business meetings/parties that they are "so lame.") 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
~. for our Eltte Events, I.,. $anFrancJsco Shirt .. ·. 25;,1'; f'iiri,'·:r4A.·d· 
."t.t...:. ~·_·4:.;!,rv· 
'4.,,: 
'Q 
t, Where do you Yelp? You Yetp San 
Fmncisco"dan't you? elmon, Sure 
¥~u do. SF is where we started and 
continue to. gCl s.trmlil-Thfs shirt was 
p(l~ted fna limited run for aur first big 
.ho'hday party. On rny gosh~ ,you 
weren' tnere?lt was 6.t1Jy Uke the 
coolest freaking party on thepfanet 
Yottre so larne.. . 
S:arShir1 ,", "' ... " {' ~ .. 
Requests by defendant to provide more services and attend its business meetings 
and '''lear and identify as defendant's agents and/or employees. Business meeting 
with free liquor ~' .•. for our first big holiday party. Oh my gosh, you 
weren't there? It was like the coolest frealdng party on the planet. 
60 You're so lame. " 
61 . Free T Shirt to terrorize businessmen, "This is sooo going into my Yelp Review!" or 
62 words to that effect. 
63 4. I have examined the defendant's publishing and found the free or below cost 
64 uniforms that defendant requires Yelp non wage paid workers to wear. Yelp, Inc. 
65 uniform includes Yelp "undies" and tank top and photographs blatantly promising 
.e 
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66 Charles Manson-like sadomasochism, homosexual and heterosexual adventures as one 
67 of the Yelp, Inc., non wage paid laborers. 
68 
Th~~t's Totally Going in my Review Shirt 
C'mon. Like, you know you've totally said this 
while waiting in line at that french place that 
thinks that it I scooler than it is I where your 
74 friend's cousin thinks thai' bartender is a total player. You're 
75 writing about that. Totally. These suckers were handed out 
76 at our Hot Summer' Nights party. 
. 
AI 
